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Introduction and Overview
As one of the cornerstones of regulation in the information age,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University. B.A. 1986, Yale University;
J.D. 1989, Harvard University. I am grateful to Craig Allen Nard and James B. Speta for
their comments on drafts of this Article and to Jane M. Rolling and Charles D. Schmidt
for their research assistance. Prior to becoming an academic, I represented AT&T in
certain matters discussed in this Article. See infra note 7.
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the Telecommunications Act of 19961 has already attracted
substantial academic attention2 and provoked sharp legal debate.3
This attention is appropriate, for enactment of the
Telecommunications Act was the most important transformative
event in telecommunications law since January 1, 1984: on that date,
the Bell System was broken up under the terms of a 1982 consent
decree which had been entered into by the federal government and
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T"). 4 This
demise of the vertically integrated telecommunications giant also
attracted substantial academic and popular attention befitting such a
landmark event.5 Neither the break-up of the Bell System in the early
1980's nor the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in short, has wanted
for examination.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Symposium, Telecommunications Law: Unscrambling the Signals,
Unbundling the Law, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 819 (1997); Symposium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 117
(1996).
3. Compare, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the
Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081 (1997) [hereinafter Tragedy of
the Telecommons], and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the
Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997), with William J.
Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract,
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1997) [hereinafter
Deregulatory Takings] (responding to the first Sidak & Spulber article), and William J.
Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require that We Kill the Competitive
Goose? Pricing Local Phone Service to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1122 (1998) (responding
to the second).
4. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
5. See, e.g., AFTER THE BREAKUP: ASSESSING THE NEW POST-AT&T DIVESTITURE
ERA (Barry G. Cole ed., 1991); ALVIN VON Auw, HERITAGE & DESTINY: REFLECTIONS
ON THE BELL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1983); BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 41 (David S. Evans ed., 1982); STEVE
COLL, THE DEAL OFTHE CENTURY: THE BREAK-UP OF AT&T (1986); DISCONNECTING
BELL: THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T DIVESTITURE (Harry M. Shooshan III ed., 1984);
FRED W. HENCK & BERNARD STRASSBURG, A SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE LONG ROAD TO
THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1988); LEONARD A. SCHLESINGER ET AL., CHRONICLES OF
CORPORATE CHANGE: MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM AT&T AND ITS OFFSPRING
(1987); ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAK-UP OF AT&T (1989); PETER
TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM (1989); Rachel Baker & Bruce Yandle, Financial
Markets and the AT&T Antitrust Settlement, 20 EASTERN ECON. 1. 429 (1994); Timothy J.
Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets:
Understanding the Divestiture in United States v. AT&T, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 741 (1987);
Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and
Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983); Roger G. Noll & Bruce
M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290 (John J. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
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Structural regulation of the telecommunications industry
between these landmark events is another story. The period from
1984 to 1996 is of central importance in understanding the current
regulatory debates in the telecommunications industry. These twelve
years witnessed not only the birth of AT&T's progeny-the so-called
"Baby Bells" or Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs")-
but also these companies' attempts to expand beyond local telephony
to other businesses. Today, each of the RBOCs is a giant
telecommunications company in its own right, but the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 largely continues the 1982 consent
decree's prohibition of the RBOCs from the business they most long
for: the long-distance business. Because the consent decree, known
as the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"), spoke to and in
numerous instances prohibited this RBOC expansion, it provided the
primary structural regulation of the telecommunications industry.
Despite the MFJ's centrality to the telecommunications
industry's structure and its highly controversial restrictions excluding
the RBOCs from long distance and other lines of business, Judge
Harold H. Greene's administration of the MFJ has escaped a
comprehensive scholarly treatment.6 The critiques that have been
offered instead are impressionistic or at best anecdotal assessments
frequently tinged-if not imbued-with partisan color. For example,
Peter Huber, a well-known commentator on public policy issues who
doubles as an RBOC lawyer,7 has been especially critical of the
6. By contrast, the issue of the economic effect or desirability of the MFJ's line-of-
business restrictions has not wanted for scholarly attention. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan,
Is The Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?, 40 ANTrrRUST BULL. 455 (1995);
Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 835, 851-56 (1997); Marcellus S. Snow, The AT&T Divestiture: A 10-Year
Retrospective, in BEYOND COMPETITION: THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 207
(Donald M. Lamberton ed., 1995); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Preserving Long Distance
Competition Upon Baby Bell Entry and Attaining Local Exchange Competition: We'll Not
Preserve the One Unless We Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 487 (1996); Lawrence A.
Sullivan & Ellen Hertz, The AT&T Antitrust Consent Decree: Should Congress Change the
Rules?, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 233 (1990); Peter Temin & Joseph Weber, The Modification of
Final Judgment: Its Logic and Echoes, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201 (1997); see also
infra note 240 (discussing articles in Managerial and Decision Economics); Richard E.
Wiley, The Media and Communications Revolution" An Overview of the Regulatory
Framework and Developing Trends, 325 PLI/Pat. 469, 604-19 (1991) (available on
Westlaw) (providing useful summary of responsibilities of the MFJ court through
publication date). The question here accordingly is not whether the MFJ had a positive or
negative effect on the economy, but rather whether Judge Greene's administration of the
MFJ was legally sound.
7. See Joseph D. Kearney, Twilight of the FCC?, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 327, 328 (1998).
Huber's role with regard to the MFJ is even more complex than set forth in the text above.
See infra text preceding note 130 (describing Huber's role as a consultant to the
Department of Justice in the triennial review proceeding). I do not suggest that Huber's
actions that Judge Greene took during the twelve-year life span of the
MFJ. Huber has contended that "[g]etting an answer to a simple
question often took years" and, with characteristic flair, referred to
one proposal by the Department of Justice to loosen the MFJ's
restrictions as a "Son-of-Sam decree."8 Notwithstanding the lack of
disinterest on the part of Huber and many other MFJ critics, their
characterizations of the MFJ's tenure were uncritically accepted to
the point that the Telecommunications Act generally came to be
thought necessary to end abuses that arose under the MFJ.9 It
required only slight hyperbole, for example, for one of Judge
Greene's rare defenders to say even early in the lifespan of the MFJ
that "Greene is treated like some ill-tempered troll intent on blocking
the way of the regional Bell firms."' 0
In these circumstances, the time is right for a comprehensive,
end-of-the-day assessment of Judge Greene's administration of the
MFJ. Was Judge Greene the one-man regulatory commission, bound
by no law and engaged in fly-specking oversight of the RBOCs'
multifarious roles disqualify him from opining on the MFJ. The story of the MFJ is
sufficiently complex that any disqualification would eliminate almost all people who have
the knowledge necessary to relate it. Indeed, such a disqualification would also apply to
the current Article. Prior to entering academe, I worked in private practice for some six
years at a law firm that provided AT&T's primary outside counsel. Five of these years
(running from 1990 to 1995) were during the tenure of the MFJ, and I spent a substantial
amount of time working on MFJ-related matters for AT&T. I have no continuing
relationship with AT&T (other than as its customer), and the MFJ has now become part
of our collective legal past. The reader nonetheless should be aware of my possible bias.
8. PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND
LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 99 (1997).
9. See, e.g., SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 231 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1998) (and sources cited); Leslie Cauley, Bells Prepare to Ask Judge Greene to Give Up
Oversight, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1994, at A3 (news article characterizing MFJ as having
"controlled nearly every aspect of [RBOCI existence for the past decade"); Dingell Scores
FCC and Kennard, Recommends Downsizing of Agency, 75 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 702 (Dec. 24, 1998) (quoting Democrat John Dingell of the House of
Representatives as saying that Judge Greene is "the only fellow who has done a worse job
on telecommunications than the FCC"); Larry Downes, Microsoft's Best Defense Is a Lack
of a Good Remedy, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1998, at 23A ("No one wants to repeat the
tragedy of Judge Harold Greene trying to run the American telecommunications industry
from his chambers, which he did for over 10 years after the AT&T case."); Phillip D.
Mink, Half of Congress Ready to Answer the Call, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1989, at A14
(opinion piece characterizing Judge Greene as "relying on archaic economic theory and
ideological animus"); Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A Second
Opinion, 29 CONN. L. REv. 289, 306 (1996) (terming Judge Greene a "regulatory czar"
and "an obstacle to competition" not only in long distance, information services, and
manufacturing, but also in local exchange service); see also infra note 240. These citations
could be multiplied manyfold.
10. Leonard Heymann, A Final Word- Judge Greene Deserves Industry's Respect,
COMMUN. WK., Dec. 21, 1987, at 12.
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activities from 1984 to 1996, as his detractors contend? Or, by
contrast, was his administration of the MFJ largely characterized by
sober application of the basic antitrust principles on which the MFJ
was premised and from which judicial deviation would have been
unjustified? In addressing this period from 1984 to 1996 (and the
relevant antecedent events), this Article attempts to answer these
questions and, in the process, to set forth a basic account of the
administration of the MFJ upon which subsequent scholars can rely."
Before sketching out the course of the Article, it may be noted
that this project is not merely of historical interest. First, the 1996
Telecommunications Act adopts many of the MFJ's core concepts as
Judge Greene had interpreted them.12 In order fully to comprehend
the current disputes before the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and state public utility commissions, it is therefore necessary
to understand and appreciate the way in which the MFJ was
administered.
Furthermore, the current importance of antitrust concepts in
telecommunications regulation requires a retrospective of regulation
under the MFJ. For example, section 601 of the 1996
Telecommunications Act establishes a regime under which antitrust
at least potentially has broader application than was the case under
the original Communications Act of 1934,13 and the massive
11. It should be noted that no attempt is made to discuss or even cite every proceeding
or controversy that came before the district court under the MFJ. This would be a nearly
impossible undertaking, given the many hundreds of opinions and orders that the court
entered in the more than twelve years between divestiture and the ultimate termination of
the MFJ. In any event, the gains in comprehensiveness from such an account would be
more than offset by the losses in comprehensibility. This Article instead describes the
most important controversies under the MFJ and thereby also provides a framework
within which any other controversies can be more readily understood.
12. It is for this reason that, for example, the Federal Communications Commission
has determined in certain instances to look to precedent under the MTFJ in interpreting the
Telecommunications Act's restrictions on RBOC involvement in long-distance service.
See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Ameritech Corp., 13 FCC Rcd 21438,21474 n.168 (1998).
13. Two aspects of section 601 may lead to this result. First, section 601(b)(1) provides
that, with certain limited exceptions, "nothing" in the Communications Act of 1934 or its
amendments in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 "shall be construed to modify,
impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws." Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 601(b)(1), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56, 143 (1996), 47 U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West
Supp. 1999). Depending on how it is interpreted, this provision may mean that, regardless
of the ultimate resolution of the question whether telecommunications carriers must or
may file tariffs containing their rates, see generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1323,
1330-40 & n.64 (1998) (describing filed-rate system and possible effect of
Telecommunications Act on that system), the limited antitrust immunity conferred by the
rate-filing provisions of Title II of the Communications Act has been eliminated, cf.
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409 (1986) (reaffirming antitrust
immunity provided by rate-filing system). Second, section 601(b)(2) repeals section 221(a)
consolidation that has occurred in some sectors of the economy has
visited the telecommunications industry as well.14 Indeed, completed
and pending RBOC mergers not only create aspects of the market
structure that the MFJ sought to eliminate-in particular, nationwide
end-to-end conglomeration' 5-but also present (through the Hart-
Scott-Rodino process) the opportunity for explicit antitrust planning
of telecommunications markets through consent decrees. An
evaluation of the life of the MFJ, which is now regarded as the
granddaddy of antitrust consent decrees, is the only appropriate
starting point.
More generally, evaluating the MFJ may yield insights into the
role of judges in administering consent decrees. The proper functions
and responsibilities of the judiciary have received a substantial
amount of academic attention in recent decades. 16 An examination of
the MFJ is an appropriate addition to this literature, for it is unlikely
that any consent decree has had a greater impact on the American
economy and society; indeed, few litigated trial-court judgments have
had as large an effect as the MFJ. While most of that effect may have
derived from the divestiture and not from the prospective line-of-
business restrictions (and thus from the initial implementation of the
MFJ and not its post-divestiture administration), these remedies were
regarded by the parties and the court as inextricably linked. And
most of the criticism of the MFJ and thus the perceived need for the
1996 Telecommunications Act arose from Judge Greene's post-1984
administration of the decree.
Part I of this Article reviews the basic facts surrounding the entry
of the Communications Act, which had embodied the principle, derived from the Willis-
Graham Act, Pub. L. No. 15, 42 Stat. 27 (1921), that the FCC could immunize mergers of
telephone companies from the antitrust laws. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994)
(repealed) with Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56,143,47
U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West Supp. 1999).
14. See Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony's Deregulatory
Shootout, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1999).
15. A similar statement could be made of AT&T. Through its merger with one of the
nation's two largest cable companies (Telecommunications, Inc. or TCI) and a proposed
joint venture with the other (Time-Warner), AT&T is coming one vertical step closer to
being able to offer nationwide end-to-end service that bundles, among other things, local
and long-distance service. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1373 n.238 (and
sources cited) (AT&T-TCI merger); Seth Schiesel, Time Warner Joins Forces with AT&T,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,1999, at C1.
16. For some of the more prominent examples of scholarly attention to this area, see
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToxIc DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Supervising Judicial Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Robert F.
Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from
Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.501400
August 1999] TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNDER JUDGE GREENE 1401
of the MFJ and the structural separation it imposed on the Bell
System. No attempt is made to reiterate the entire history of the
United States' lawsuit against AT&T.17 To assess the administration
of the MFJ, however, it is necessary to describe in some detail both
the United States' litigation theories in that lawsuit and some of the
alternative, rejected proposals for a settlement. This part also
describes Judge Greene's approval of the MFJ in 1982 insofar as that
is relevant to its later administration. Particular attention is paid to
the line-of-business restrictions that prevented the divested RBOCs
from participating in the long-distance, manufacturing, and
information-services sectors of the telecommunications industry and
indeed limited them initially to providing local common-carriage
service. Once divestiture was completed on January 1, 1984, these
restrictions were a continual source of controversy and satellite
litigation until the Telecommunications Act was enacted more than
twelve years later. This part finally considers the substantive text and
procedures involved for RBOC requests for relief from the line-of-
business restrictions.
Part II discusses the administration of the MFJ in the first several
years after the January 1, 1984 divestiture. This discussion
encompasses Judge Greene's procedures for RBOC requests for
relief from the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions and, as a
component of those procedures, the Department of Justice's ongoing
role in administering the MFJ. During these first several years after
divestiture, the RBOCs made clear the extent of their unhappiness
with the line-of-business restrictions. Towards the end of this time
period, the Department of Justice also revealed a discomfort with
these restrictions. This part thus concludes by discussing the tenuous
hold on life that the line-of-business restrictions appeared to possess
at the end of 1986.
Part I focuses on the ensuing massive struggle among the
parties to the MFJ and other industry players over whether the line-
of-business restrictions should be removed. This struggle took the
form of the so-called "triennial review," which was spearheaded by
the Department of Justice and initially culminated in a report to the
court in 1987-three years after divestiture and adoption of the line-
of-business restrictions. Although Judge Greene ruled in the triennial
review in 1987 that the so-called "catch-all" restriction, which
essentially prevented the RBOCs from engaging in any business other
than the common carriage of local telecommunications, should be
17. This history (or aspects of it) can be found in numerous other places. See, e.g.,
authorities cited supra note 5; Mark C. Rosenblum, The Antitrust Rationale for the MFJ's
Line-of-Business Restrictions and a Policy Proposal for Removing Them, 25 SW. U. L.
REV. 605,606-15 (1996).
lifted, he retained the long-distance, manufacturing, and information-
services bans. These important issues were not conclusively
determined, however, until the D.C. Circuit in 1990 affirmed the
retention of the long-distance and manufacturing restrictions and,
following a remand from that court, Judge Greene lifted the
information-services restriction in 1991. The triennial review finally
ended when the D.C. Circuit affirmed this removal of the
information-services restriction in 1993 and the Supreme Court
denied review later that year.
Part IV concludes the history of the MFJ. First, it provides a
brief overview of the litigation in the district court that arose in the
aftermath of the D.C. Circuit's 1990 triennial review ruling. Although
no broad-based assault on the MFJ was litigated to a judgment after
the triennial review, the RBOCs made a series of requests for
declaratory rulings or piecemeal waivers of the decree (for example,
to provide long-distance service in connection with their authorized
cellular services). Several of these requests were potentially far-
reaching, not only because of the services that the RBOCs wanted
explicitly authorized, but also because the legal theories on which
they rested would have supported much broader relief.
Second, this part of the Article describes the RBOCs' ultimately
successful effort to get out of Judge Greene's courtroom. Largely
unsuccessful in the courtroom and on appeal, the RBOCs began
seeking congressional legislation shortly after they came into
existence in the mid-1980's and continued to lobby Congress and the
executive branch for a decade. The end-product of this process was
the Telecommunications Act of 1996: after its passage, Judge Greene
terminated the MFJ. Although the RBOCs were now free of Judge
Greene, this legislation was not an unalloyed victory. Several of the
MFJ's restrictions-including most notably the long-distance
injunction-were carried over into the legislation (with jurisdiction
over them granted to the FCC), and the RBOCs were required to
permit the development of competition with their local services.
Part V synthesizes the foregoing account into a comprehensive
assessment of Judge Greene's tenure. Contrary to the loudest
criticisms, Judge Greene administered the MFJ efficiently and in
accord with its letter and purposes. Many of Congress's actions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 approve Judge Greene's work,
although some limited contrary inferences can also be drawn from
this legislation. More importantly, the decade of rulings by the D.C.
Circuit in MFJ appeals generally confirms the conclusion that Judge
Greene's superintendence of the MFJ was legally sound. At the end
of the day, to the extent that there was a substantial problem with the
MFJ, as the RBOCs and their supporters long claimed, it derived
either from the shifting and inconsistent views of the Department of
[7ol.50HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
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Justice concerning the wisdom of the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions or from the failure of the political branches to assert
primacy on the issue of the proper structure of the
telecommunications industry. The MFJ's lasting lesson for public
policy is that, at least in the antitrust context, reliance on a structural
consent decree that is premised on an articulable economic theory
and is administered by a court committed to that theory can be a
defensible judicial enterprise.
I. The Government, the Bell System, and Judge Greene
The history of telecommunications regulation for most of this
century is a history of regulation of the Bell System.18 This history
has been the subject of much scholarly examination, and it does not
require repeating here.19 For the same reason, it is also not necessary
to recount all details of the government's lawsuit against AT&T that
culminated in the MFJ. 20 This part instead addresses that background
to the extent necessary to understand the decree that settled the
litigation (i.e., the MFJ) and to evaluate the way in which that decree
was administered in the ensuing decade and a half. In particular, the
following describes the essential theory of the government's case-
regulatory failure-and the way in which the MFJ closely hewed to
that theory by imposing a structural remedy of divestiture and going-
forward line-of-business restrictions on the divested companies that
retained the ability to impede competition (i.e., the BOCs).
18. The structure of the Bell System can be summarized as follows. AT&T was the
parent company. Its subsidiaries or divisions included (a) the more than twenty Bell
Operating Companies ("BOCs"), such as New York Telephone, Illinois Bell, and Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph, through which more than eighty percent of Americans received
their local telephone service; (b) AT&T Long Lines, through which the Bell System
provided "intercity" or "long distance" service to virtually all Americans (given that non-
BOC local carriers, such as GTE Corp., would interconnect their customers to this long-
distance service); and (c) Western Electric Co., which manufactured both customer
premises equipment, such as telephones, which the BOCs would lease to their customers,
and telecommunications equipment, such as the switches that the BOCs and AT&T would
use in providing service. Another component of the Bell System was Bell Telephone
Laboratories, Inc., which was half-owned by AT&T directly and half-owned by AT&T's
subsidiary, Western Electric, and which, among other things, designed and developed both
customer premises equipment and telecommunications equipment.
19. For discussions of historical aspects of telecommunications regulation, see, e.g.,
MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, §§ 1.3, 2.1-2.15,
at 11-22, 77-136 (1992); GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 49-146 (1994); Noll & Owen,
supra note 5, at 291-95; Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the Public Good Regulation and
Competition in Telecommunications, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS 27-103 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds., 1989).
20. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 5. For a particularly sophisticated explication
of each side's theories and evidence, see Noll & Owen, supra note 5, at 295-326.
1403
A. The Lawsuit
On November 20, 1974, the United States filed an action against
AT&T in federal district court in Washington, D.C. under section 2 of
the Sherman Act.21 This was not the federal government's initial
antitrust effort against the Bell System.P' The immediately preceding
lawsuit, brought in the District of New Jersey in 1949, had been
settled by a consent decree in 1956.23 This consent decree had
provoked controversy because of the perception that the government
had bowed to pressure mounted by AT&T.24  The principal
provisions of this decree limited AT&T to providing common-
carriage communications service-i.e., local and long-distance
telephone service.25 It also required AT&T to license Bell System
patents and permitted it to manufacture telecommunications
equipment.26
The 1974 lawsuit was sweeping in its allegations. The
government claimed that AT&T had used its vertically integrated
organization to impede competition in telecommunications industry
segments that by their nature should not have been served by a single
provider-specifically, long-distance service and equipment
manufacturing. At the time, AT&T possessed, through its Bell
Operating Companies, state franchises to provide local telephone
service to more than eighty percent of the nation's subscribers and
invariably did so on a monopoly basis.27 Though not challenging the
21. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The statute proscribes monopolizing, attempting to
monopolize, or combining or conspiring to monopolize any part of the nation's interstate
or foreign commerce.
22. The first such lawsuit was begun in 1913 and settled in 1914 under a consent decree
that embodied the so-called "Kingsbury Commitment," which required AT&T to connect
customers of "independent" (Le., non-BOC) local telephone companies to AT&T's long-
distance network. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 19, §§ 1.3.3, 4.2, at 16, 199-201;
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1342 n.79,1350-51.
23. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Case. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J.
1956).
24. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 19, § 4.3, at 205 & n.21; HOUSE COMMITEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSENT
DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, H.R. Res. 27, 86th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1959).
25. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 19, § 4.3, at 203-04. An exception permitted the
Bell System to provide other services to the federal government. See id.
26. See id. at 203.
27. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993 n.8 (D.D.C. 1983).
The BOCs consisted of 22 mostly well-known companies, such as New York Telephone,
Illinois Bell, Michigan Bell, Ohio Bell, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, and the like. See
MFJ, Appendix A (listing the BOCs), reprinted in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
131, 232 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). The BOCs owned "bottleneck facilities in virtually every major and medium-sized
metropolitan and industrial area in the country." Policy and Rules Concerning the
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existence of these monopolies, the United States alleged that AT&T
had used the monopolies unlawfully to leverage into the long-distance
service and the equipment markets, thereby impeding competition in
those markets.
It is important to appreciate that, in the decades leading up to its
antitrust action, the government had attempted to rely on regulation
to prevent the Bell System's monopolization of potentially
competitive markets. This was true of both manufacturing and long
distance. With regard to the former, the FCC engaged in massive
proceedings intended to ensure that non-Bell System manufacturers
could compete on the merits with Western Electric (the Bell System's
manufacturing arm) for BOC equipment purchases. The FCC thus
adopted rules and regulations intended to prevent the BOCs from
releasing technical and other information in a way that discriminated
in favor of Western Electric, and to prevent the BOCs from allocating
excessive product development costs to their monopoly ratebase.28
Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellular
Communications Services by the Bell Operating Companies, 95 F.C.C.2d 1117, 1138-39
(1983), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984). The
nation's remaining subscribers were served by non-Bell telephone companies, collectively
referred to as "independents." The largest of these independents was GTE Corporation,
which was not only far smaller than the Bell System but also served "mostly rural, widely
scattered areas." Id.; see also United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984)
(Greene, J.) (approving consent decree in antitrust case that adopted separate-subsidiary
and injunctive provisions but not divestiture and explaining why GTE was thus treated
differently from the Bell System). Each of the nation's local exchange companies-
whether a BOC or an independent-possessed a license (or a "franchise") from its state to
provide telecommunications service. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721,
726 (1999).
28. For just a few examples of such FCC proceedings, see AT&T and the Associated
Bell Cos., Charges for Interstate Tel. Serv., 27 F.C.C.2d 151 (1971) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order), 64 F.C.C.2d 131 (1976) (Phase H Initial Decision of Administrative
Law Judge), 64 F.C.C.2d 1 (1977) (Phase II Final Decision and Order); AT&T and the
Associated Bell Cos., Charges for Interstate and Foreign Communication Serv., 2
F.C.C.2d 871 (1965) (Memorandum Opinion and Order), 9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967) (Interim
Decision and Order); see also Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 205-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(criticizing FCC's seemingly interminable decade of proceedings). Other FCC
proceedings with the same or similar goals continued after the Department of Justice filed
its complaint in 1974. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976) (Notice of Inquiry
and Proposed Rulemaking), 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1977) (Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and
Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking), 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979) (Tentative Decision and
Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (Final Decision),
reconsidL granted in part and denied in part, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), further reconsicL
granted in part and denied in part, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affd sub nom. Computer and
Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982); License Contract
Agreements and Other Intrasystem Arrangements of the Major Tel. Sys., 84 F.C.C.2d 259
(1981) (Notice of Inquiry), 96 F.C.C.2d 122 (1984) (Report and Order); Computer and
Bus. Equip. Mfr. Ass'n, 93 F.C.C.2d 1226 (1983) (Report and Order).
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All of this, of course, was in addition to the numerous state
proceedings in which the BOCs' rates were reviewed to ensure,
among other things, that they were based only on the reasonable costs
of providing service and did not include, for example, unreasonably
high prices incurred in transactions with affiliated enterprises such as
Western Electric. 29 With regard to the long-distance market, the FCC
had similarly attempted to develop various regulatory means for
ensuring that the BOCs could not either use their bottleneck local
facilities to frustrate the efforts of AT&T's long-distance competitors
to obtain comparable access to end-users or use their monopoly
revenues to cross-subsidize AT&T's own long-distance services.3 0
The premise of the Department of Justice's antitrust action in
1974 was that these regulations had proved incapable of ensuring
competition in the manufacturing and long-distance markets. The
Justice Department concluded that only a structural remedy of
divestiture could accomplish this end.31
The government's action was originally assigned to Judge Joseph
C. Waddy. Although there were initial skirmishes between the
29. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1360-61 & nn.170-71 (and
sources cited) (describing this traditional function of regulators).
30. To be sure, the FCC was not committed to competition in all segments of the long-
distance industry when the Department of Justice filed its action against the Bell System in
1974. See generally id. at 1342-43. But for some examples of FCC efforts along the lines
suggested in the text, see Bell Sys. Tariff Offerings of Local Distrib. Facilities for Use by
Other Common Carriers, 44 F.C.C.2d 245 (1973) (Memorandum Opinion and Order to
Show Cause), 46 F.C.C.2d 413 (1974) (Decision), 48 F.C.C.2d 676 (1974) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order), affd sub nor. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir.
1974). Here, too, the FCC's efforts did not end when the Department of Justice filed its
antitrust action against AT&T. See, e.g., Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and
Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities, 47 F.C.C.2d 644 (1974) (Notice of
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking), 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976) (Report and Order), reconsid.
granted in part and denied in part, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), affd sub nom. AT&T v. FCC,
572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978); AT&T, Restrictions on Interconnection of Private Line Servs.,
60 F.C.C.2d 939 (1976) (Memorandum Opinion and Order); AT&T, Revisions of Tariff
FCC No. 260 Private Line Servs., Series 5000, 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order), reconsid. granted in part and denied in part, 64 F.C.C.2d 971 (1977),
further reconsid. granted in part and denied in part, 67 F.C.C.2d 1441 (1978), affd sub nom.
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Manual and Procedures
for the Allocation of Costs, 73 F.C.C.2d 629 (1979) (Notice of Inquiry), 78 F.C.C.2d 1296
(1980) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 84 F.C.C.2d 384 (1981) (Report and Order),
reconsid. granted in part and denied in part, 86 F.C.C.2d 667 (1981), affd sub nom. MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 408 (D.C. 1982); Regulatory Policies Concerning
Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Pub. Switched Network Servs., 83
F.C.C.2d 167 (1980) (Report and Order), reconsid. denied, 86 F.C.C.2d 820 (1981).
31. See United States v. AT&T, Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.), Complaint, Prayer, paras.
1, 3-5 (Nov. 20, 1974). The government was open to the possibility of AT&T's divestiture
of both Western Electric and some or all of the BOCs. See id., paras. 3,5.
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parties, and Judge Waddy issued some preliminary rulings,32 the most
significant events within the first few years of the litigation were the
death of Judge Waddy and the subsequent reassignment of the
lawsuit to Judge Greene.33  Given the immensity of the case,
commentators of the period were skeptical that the case would ever
reach trial?34
This skepticism proved unfounded, primarily because of Judge
Greene. Riding herd on the lawyers involved in the case,35 Judge
Greene imposed aggressive discovery deadlines and implemented
various procedural devices to narrow the issues in the case.36 The
32. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976) (rejecting AT&T's
claim that regulation by FCC and state public utility commissions rendered it immune
from antitrust liability); 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,097 (D.D.C. 1976) (rejecting
AT&T's claim that the 1956 consent decree barred government's suit under doctrine of res
judicata); see also United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1317-20 (D.D.C. 1978)
(Greene, J.) (surveying rulings made by Judge Waddy).
33. For an observation of how history might have been different if Judge Waddy's
docket had been distributed slightly differently after his death, see Huber, supra note 8, at
89-90 (contrasting reassignments of government lawsuit to Judge Greene and of Southern
Pacific's private antitrust action against AT&T to Judge Richey); Kearney & Merrill,
supra note 13, at 1376-77 (same). The government's case was assigned to Judge Greene
on June 22, 1978. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314,1320 (D.D.C. 1978).
34. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 826
(1976) (assumption that government's then-pending antitrust claim against the Bell
System "is ever litigated" would be "a bold assumption given the scope of discovery alone
which would be involved"); Vietor, supra note 19, at 79 (noting that Judge Greene
"surprised observers by tenaciously moving the antitrust case through discovery,
stipulations, contentions, and proof to trial on January 15, 1981"); see also TEMIN, supra
note 5, at 115 ("The logistics of this suit-the number of people and papers involved-
were unbelievably complex, and AT&T had to organize a special department,
Administration D, just to provide support for its lawyers."). For some sense of the
massive size of the Bell System, see infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (describing
size of the divested RBOCs). For some entertaining contrasts in views of the Bell System
in its day, compare JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, MONOPOLY (1968), and JOHN PATRICK
PHILLIPS, MA BELL'S MILLIONS (1970) with JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS (1976), and FOR NOTEWORTHY PUBLIC SERVICE: THEODORE N.
VAIL NATIONAL AWARDS (1950). Their very titles connote these books' differing takes
on the Bell System.
35. The term "herd" is apt. By the time of trial, the Department of Justice had about
sixty lawyers on the case. See TEMIN, supra note 5, at 210. The Bell System almost
certainly had an even greater number. Cf. United States v. AT&T, 1982-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) [ 64,465 (D.D.C. 1982) (post-trial comment by Judge Greene that "[u]nlike the
usual case where the United States is the party, it appears that in this particular instance
the balance of resources may have favored the Government's opponents").
36. In particular, Judge Greene required the United States and the Bell System each
to submit a series of lengthy statements of contentions and proof, which summarized the
evidence that the filing party was prepared to introduce, and then, in order to narrow the
issues for trial, further required them to negotiate a series of stipulations. See TEMIN,
supra note 5, at 202-03; see also infra note 37 (citing various procedural pre-trial rulings by
Judge Greene).
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effect of these actions was to make clear to the parties that Judge
Greene would not be deterred by the size or complexity of the lawsuit
and further would actively ensure that the case would go to trial.
Judge Greene's decisions in United States v. AT&T in the late
1970's were not limited to procedure. His most important pre-trial
ruling rejected AT&T's claim that the Bell System's regulation by the
FCC and the states immunized its actions from antitrust scrutiny.37
By the end of 1980, as a result of Judge Greene's active judicial
The government used this process to justify its request for a structural remedy of
divestiture, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, as opposed to injunctive relief. For
example, the Department of Justice explained as follows:
The government contends that injunctive relief cannot be effective because
defendants' illegal monopolization and exclusionary behavior flow inherently
from their structure. AT&T's integrated structure gives it the incentive and
ability to frustrate any injunctive relief in order to preserve its illegal monopolies.
AT&T's control of both Long Lines and the Bell operating companies, for
example, gives AT&T the incentive and ability to utilize the Bell operating
companies' monopoly of local distribution services to prevent other intercity
carriers from competing effectively. Likewise, AT&T's control of Western
Electric, Long Lines, and the Bell operating companies gives AT&T the
incentive and ability to protect Western's monopoly of telecommunications
equipment. [ ] As long as the incentive and ability to engage in such
exclusionary conduct remain, there is no reason to expect that injunctive relief
directed at exclusionary conduct will be effective. Only relief that eliminates the
existing inherent, structural incentive and ability of AT&T to monopolize
telecommunications services and telecommunications equipment will be effective
to restore competition in these markets.
United States v. AT&T, Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.), Plaintiff's First Statement of
Contentions and Proof, at 526-27 (Nov. 1, 1978). The Department proceeded to detail the
structural relief that it sought, which included both divestiture and a provision under
which "[t]he local operating companies would be prohibited from owning any intercity
facilities" or from "be[ing] affiliated with any owner of intercity facilities." Id. at 527.
37. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-30 (D.D.C. 1978). This was
essentially a reaffirmance of an earlier ruling that Judge Waddy had made. See id. at 1318,
1320-21 (citing United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976)). For various other
pre-trial rulings by Judge Greene, see United States v. AT&T, 83 F.R.D. 323 (D.D.C.
1979) (ruling on stipulations process and other procedural matters and rejecting
government's request for bifurcated trial with first phase to concern "background issues");
United States v. AT&T, 84 F.R.D. 350 (D.D.C. 1979) (further ruling on stipulations and
related matters); United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1980) (adopting
substantive and procedural guidelines of the Special Masters with regard to claims of
privilege and issuing ruling concerning imposition of costs of compliance with third-party
subpoena duces tecum); United States v. AT&T, 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1980) (ruling
on various "test-case" documents to set guidelines as to what types of documents would be
admissible notwithstanding general rule against admission of hearsay); United States v.
AT&T, 88 F.R.D. 47 (1980) (ordering parties to continue stipulations process and
postponing start of trial from October 27,1980 to January 15,1981). The D.C. Circuit also
found itself involved in a discovery dispute in the case. See United States v. AT&T, 693
F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (granting on privilege grounds MCI's request for interlocutory
relief from Judge Greene's order requiring it to disclose certain documents to AT&T).
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management and expeditious resolution of the parties' ancillary
disputes, the case was ready to be tried.
Trial commenced on January 15, 1981, and proceeded for most of
that year, with several recesses or postponements along the way.3 8
Having been required to stipulate to a wide variety of undisputed
facts and contentions, the parties had narrowed their factual disputes
to 82 segments or episodes, which in turn structured the presentation
of evidence at trial. The government introduced evidence that AT&T
had monopolized both the long-distance telecommunications market
and the market for telecommunications products (which included
switches used in internal telephone company operations, as well as
telephones and other customer premises equipment used by
residential and business customers). The means for this
monopolization, the government contended, was the Bell System's
leveraging its monopoly control over the local exchanges into the
potentially competitive long-distance and manufacturing markets by
cross-subsidizing the competitive enterprises with revenues from the
monopoly sectors and by further using various forms of
discrimination (particularly with regard to local exchange access).
The Department of Justice further introduced evidence that public
utility regulation was simply not up to the task of preventing this anti-
competitive conduct. So central was the argument of regulatory
failure to the government's case that it even called various former
high-ranking FCC employees to testify that regulators were
overmatched in trying to supervise the Bell System's mix of monopoly
and competitive (or potentially competitive) lines of business.39
In essence, the underlying question throughout the trial was
whether the problems of which the government complained were
properly addressed by regulation, as AT&T claimed, or instead
required an antitrust solution, as the Department of Justice argued.
Indeed, AT&T claimed not only that regulation was the proper
solution to any of the Bell System's shortcomings but even that many
actions of which the government complained were actually required
38. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 140 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub.
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also TEMIN, supra note 5, at
214-16, 222-23, 226-27, 232-33, 249-54, 261-62, 266-67 (describing course of trial in midst of
attempts to reach a legislative solution or an agreement between the parties).
39. See United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 & nn.7-8 (D.D.C. 1981)
(opinion considering government objections to AT&T's plan to call FCC employees to
testify and listing various former FCC employees that government had called itself);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 530-31 (D.D.C. 1987) (recounting
how "[t]he FCC's efforts to regulate the Bell System constituted a major part of the
evidence adduced during the eleven-month trial of this case, and many witnesses and a
large number of documents pointed to the FCC's lack of success in that regard"), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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by regulation. The Bell System particularly contended that its actions
in seeking to prevent the development of a competitive long-distance
market were necessary to prevent competitors from
"creamskimming," or siphoning off the Bell System's most profitable
customers. Creamskimming was possible, the Bell System argued,
because federal requirements of rate-averaging and state
requirements of universal service and cheap rates for residential
customers required the Bell System to charge some other customers
above-cost rates. Permitting competitors to creamskim, the argument
went, would frustrate these regulatory policies and would further be
unfair to AT&T.40 With regard to manufacturing, the Bell System's
basic defense was that the individual procurement decisions made
throughout the Bell System were overseen by numerous regulators
(i.e., the FCC and the state public utility commissions). To the extent
that its rate-regulated operating companies such as the BOCs and
AT&T nonetheless purchased an overwhelming percentage of
equipment designed by Bell Labs and manufactured by Western
Electric, AT&T contended, such decisions had been based on
superior price or quality.
The parties discussed the possibility of settlement at various
times before and during the trial.41  Two of the settlement
proposals-each of which would have subjected AT&T and the
BOCs to continuing detailed supervision by the district court or
associated personnel-deserve particular attention. The first, which
prompted a recess in the trial immediately after it had begun with
opening arguments on January 15, 1981, proposed a mix of both
divestiture and regulatory requirements. AT&T would have had to
spin off roughly half of Western Electric and several operating
companies, though only one of these operating companies (Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co.) was majority-owned by AT&T
(AT&T had a minority interest in the other two).42 By their very
nature, the proposed regulatory requirements cannot be summarized
so succinctly. They included an injunction governing the manner in
which the BOCs could purchase equipment and a detailed
interconnection agreement specifying how companies such as MCI
and other long-distance carriers could obtain access to the local
telephone network controlled by the BOCs. This proposed decree
40. See, e.g., AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1357-60; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161-62. For an
explication of the economic theory of creamskimming and an assessment of the Bell
System's argument, see William A. Brock & David S. Evans, Creamskimming, in
BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 61
(David S. Evans ed., 1983); see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1347 (discussing
cross-subsidization, universal service, and creamskimming).
41. See TEMIN, supra note 5, at 217-76; COLL, supra note 5, at 291-344.
42. See TEMIN, supra note 5, at 211.
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became "more and more detailed and... longer and longer" as it was
being negotiated, and it was "essentially a regulatory solution."43
Primarily for this reason, the Department of Justice dropped the
proposal, and presentation of evidence commenced on March 4,
1981.44
The parties took up another settlement proposal late in 1981
after Judge Greene denied AT&T's motion to dismiss upon close of
the government's case-in-chief.45 This proposal did not require any
divestiture. Instead, AT&T would be subjected to an "immensely
complex injunctive settlement."46  Specifically, although the Bell
System would remain under common ownership, its constituent parts
would be divided into fully separated affiliates consisting of separate
competitive and monopoly elements. This proposal rested on an
assumption that such separate-subsidiary requirements, coupled with
a wide range of rules and regulations concerning books and records,
contracts, information flow, patent licensing, and numerous other
matters, could permit the development of competition in the
telecommunications markets in which the Bell System allegedly had
used its local monopolies to foreclose competition. The parties
ultimately did not agree to the proposal.
These two proposals became known to the parties as "Quagmire
I" and "Quagmire II."47 The monikers reflected the parties' dislike
for any resolution of the case requiring ongoing judicial supervision of
the details of everyday events and transactions within the
telecommunications industry. No doubt, the parties had separate
reasons for this judgment. AT&T was already extensively regulated
by the FCC and the state public utility commissions with respect to
such events and transactions; it believed that a permanent additional
layer of bureaucracy would hamstring its efforts to compete. Nor
would any of these proposed solutions address the Department of
43. Id. at 214-15.
44. See id. at 215-16; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 140.
45. See United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981). This major ruling
had a number of components, including a determination that the court would not
separately determine the sufficiency of evidence in each contested episode. See id. at
1343-44; supra text following note 38 (explaining "episodes"). Indeed, Judge Greene
stated that the fact that the court would divide the evidence for analytical purposes into
various categories "should not obscure the fact... that the Court will be considering the
evidence in the context of a single Sherman Act claim on a course-of-conduct basis."
AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1345. Judge Greene then considered at length and rejected the
bulk of the Bell System's arguments that the government had failed to prove various
aspects of its antitrust claims. See id. at 1345-81.
46. COLL, supra note 5, at 253.
47. See TEMIN, supra note 5, at 209-16 (Quagmire I); id. at 254-56, 260-61 (Quagmire
II). The latter proposal was said to have become "so long that it resembled a telephone
book." Id. at 256.
Justice's fundamental concerns. Judge Greene later articulated one
of these concerns:
It would be difficult to formulate an [injunctive] order that would
effectively deal with all of the different kinds of anticompetitive
behavior that are claimed to have occurred over a considerable
period of time, in various geographical areas, and with respect to
many different subjects. There is evidence which suggests that
AT&T's pattern during the last thirty years has been to shift from
one anticompetitive activity to another, as various alternatives were
foreclosed through the action of regulators or the courts or as a
result of technological development. In view of this background, it
is unlikely that, realistically, an injunction could be drafted that
would be both sufficiently detailed to bar specific anticompetitive
conduct yet sufficiently broad to prevent the various conceivable
kinds of behavior that AT&T might employ in the future.48
Accordingly, the parties on several occasions rejected a
prospective regulatory injunction as a possible resolution of the
government's historic antitrust suit.
B. The Settlement
In contrast, the parties ultimately reached a settlement elegant in
its conceptual simplicity: a structural consent decree. The decree's
essential provisions mandated a divestiture and imposed a
prospective structural injunction. Specifically, AT&T (as parent
company of the Bell System) agreed to divest itself of all ownership
and control of the BOCs, and the various companies were enjoined
from combining monopoly and competitive telecommunications
businesses after divestiture. This approach was designed to ensure
the economic separation of the companies with the ability to impede
competition (i.e., the BOCs, by virtue of their local exchange
monopolies) from the companies with the incentive to do so (i.e.,
Western Electric and AT&T Long Lines, by virtue of their
participation in competitive or potentially competitive markets such
as manufacturing and long distance). In short, although the details
varied slightly from its original prayer for relief, the Department of
Justice obtained by a consent decree the structural relief that it had
long sought.
Section I of the MFJ mandated the structural separation of the
Bell System. This separation required AT&T to submit to the
Department of Justice a plan of reorganization for the Bell System.
The plan would provide for the transfer from AT&T to the BOCs of
"sufficient facilities, personnel, systems, and rights to technical
information to permit the BOCs to perform, independently of AT&T,
exchange telecommunications and exchange access functions," and
48. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 167-68 (footnotes omitted).
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for the division of the BOCs' assets between exchange and exchange
access functions and other functions.49 AT&T was further required
under section I of the MFJ to terminate various contracts, which had
economically integrated the BOCs and other components of the Bell
System, and then to divest itself of ownership of the BOCs, which
would take with them the assets related to exchange and exchange
access functions (or so-called "local functions") and leave behind
assets related to other functions.50 Section I finally forbade AT&T,
after divestiture, from "acquir[ing] the stock or assets of any BOC. '51
Section II of the MFJ imposed prospective injunctive
requirements on the post-divestiture BOCs. Under section II(A), the
BOCs were affirmatively ordered not to favor the post-divestiture
AT&T in the provision of access to local exchanges. Rather, they
were required to provide to all long-distance and information-service
providers what became known as "equal access"-that is, access to
the local exchange that was "equal in type, quality, and price to that
provided to AT&T and its affiliates. ' 52 However, the MFJ did not
simply rely on this equal access injunction to control the BOCs'
future conduct.
More controversially both at the time and in the decade and a
half to come, section II(D) of the MFJ imposed so-called "line of
business" restrictions on the BOCs. In particular, it affirmatively
banned the divested BOCs, "directly or through any affiliated
enterprise," from providing long-distance service,53 manufacturing or
49. MFJ § I(A)(1), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 226.
50. See id. § I(A)(2)-(4), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227.
51. Id. § I(D), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. Years later, section I(D) would
become an unexpected source of controversy when AT&T sought in 1994 to acquire
McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., which had not been part of the Bell System but
nonetheless fell within the definition of a "BOC" in section IV(C) of the MFJ. See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 154 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting BellSouth's request for
declaratory ruling that AT&T's acquisition of McCaw would violate section I(D)); United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 158 F.R.D. 211 (D.D.C. 1994) (subsequent ruling granting
AT&T's motion for waiver of section I(D) with respect to its acquisition of McCaw), affd,
46 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
52. MFJ § IH(A), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227.
53. Id. § II(D)(1), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227; see AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
188-89 (approving this restriction). The long-distance ban on the BOCs was, in technical
terms, a prohibition on BOC provision of "interexchange" or "interLATA" service. The
MFJ called for the division of the BOCs' service territories into separate "exchange
areas," later renamed "local access and transport areas" or "LATAs," which were defined
according to "communities of interest" and other socio-economic characteristics. See MFJ
§ IV(G)(1), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229; United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
569 F. Supp. 990, 1002 n.54 (D.D.C. 1983). These LATAs, which totalled 164 in number
and whose precise boundaries were hammered out in the massive reorganization that
followed Judge Greene's approval of the MFJ, were the areas within which the post-
divestiture BOCs were to be permitted to provide end-to-end telecommunications service.
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providing telecommunications equipment or customer premises
equipment,54 or providing so-called "information services." 55 Indeed,
lest there be any doubt on the matter, the BOCs were further barred
from "provid[ing] any other product or service, except exchange
telecommunications and exchange access service, that is not a natural
monopoly service actually regulated by tariff. ' 56 This last line-of-
business restriction would be known as the catch-all restriction and
was essentially carried over from the 1956 decree that the MFJ
replaced.5 7
The parties' agreement required Judge Greene's ratification.58 A
InterLATA service, in other words, was to be reserved to long-distance companies such as
the post-divestiture AT&T and MCI, with the BOCs providing originating access (Le.,
carriage from the calling party to a long-distance company) and terminating access (i.e.,
carriage from the long-distance company to the called party) on interLATA calls. The
opposite was not true: intraLATA toll service was not reserved under the MFJ to the post-
divestiture BOCs. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1108
(D.D.C. 1983), affd mem. sub nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). The
decision whether to allow intraLATA competition was rather reserved to state regulators,
save in those few circumstances where LATAs crossed state borders. See Western Elec.
Co., 569 F. Supp. at 1002 n.54.
54. MFJ § II(D)(2), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. But see infra note 65 and
accompanying text (describing modification to proposed decree to permit BOCs to
provide but not manufacture customer premises equipment). The terms
"telecommunications equipment" and "customer premises equipment" respectively
referred to equipment used by telecommunications service providers for internal functions
and to the equipment such as handsets used by customers at their homes or places of
business (traditionally pursuant to a lease from the telephone company). See MFJ
§ IV(E), (N), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228, 229; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 190-93
(approving manufacturing restriction).
55. MFJ § II(D)(1) (barring RBOC provision of information services), reprinted in
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227; see id. § IV(J) (defining "information service" essentially as
"the offering of a capability for... making available information which may be conveyed
via telecommunications"), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
189-90 (approving this restriction).
56. MFJ § II(D)(3), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228; see id. § IV(F), (G)
(defining "exchange" and "exchange access"), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228-29.
57. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (describing the 1956 decree).
58. The story of how jurisdiction to approve the MFJ became vested in Judge Greene
is itself an interesting one and has been recounted by Temin. See TEMIN, supra note 5, at
274-76, 279-80. It entailed a transfer of jurisdiction over the 1956 decree (the "Final
Judgment") from the District of New Jersey to Judge Greene. Because the 1956 decree
bore the caption "United States v. Western Electric Co.," and because Judge Greene
technically dismissed the government's 1974 action against the Bell System (which had
borne the caption "United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Civil Action
No. 74-1698") when he approved the Modification of Final Judgment, see United States v.
AT&T, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10645 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1982), all subsequent proceedings
both before and after divestiture would go down in history under the caption "United
States v. Western Electric Co., Civil Action No. 82-0192." Unless otherwise indicated, all
citations in this Article of filings between January 8, 1982 and August 24, 1982 are of
materials filed under both case names and numbers, and all citations of filings after
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1974 law popularly known as the Tunney Act requires judicial
approval of any consent decree settling a civil antitrust suit brought
by the United States.59 The parties and hundreds of interested non-
parties accordingly engaged in an extensive process of filing
comments and briefs on whether the proposed decree was "in the
public interest."6 Throughout this so-called Tunney Act proceeding,
the Department of Justice argued that the structural relief upon
which it had insisted in the MFJ was superior to various regulatory
alternatives.61  It particularly defended the line-of-business
restrictions to be imposed on the divested BOCs, explaining at length
its view that "regulatory mechanisms ... are not sufficient to control
the long term incentives and abilities the BOCs would have to
disadvantage competitors in related markets." 62 For example, after
recounting how "the FCC struggled for more than 20 years
unsuccessfully to solve the problem" of cross-subsidization between
the Bell System's monopoly and competitive enterprises, the
Department of Justice also detailed the BOCs' continuing ability to
discriminate against non-affiliated long-distance and manufacturing
competitors:
Nor is it likely that regulation could effectively ensure non-
discriminatory access to essential local exchange facilities. Again,
as a number of commenters pointed out, this is a subject that has
preoccupied regulation for more than a decade with little success.
Particularly in a technologically dynamic industry such as
telecommunications, there is little possibility that regulation is
capable of detecting or preventing the very subtle forms of
discrimination that would be available to the BOCs. Thus, even
were it possible to prescribe in detail the appropriate technical
parameters of interconnection under current technological
conditions, regulators would have to have sufficient foresight to
determine in advance the discriminatory potential inherent in
August 24,1982 are of materials filed under the Western Electric name and number.
59. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1706, codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994). Because the MFJ was technically a modification
of the existing 1956 decree, it was not clear whether the Tunney Act applied ex proprio
vigore. See generally John D. Anderson, Note, Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees:
Over A Double Barrel, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 134, 136-41 (1985) (discussing question and
arguing that Tunney Act does not apply to modifications). Nonetheless, after intense
pressure from Judge Greene, the parties agreed to follow the Tunney Act's procedures.
See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 143-47.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e).
61. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, at 50-53 (filed by the Department of
Justice on Feb. 10, 1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7181 (Feb. 17, 1982); Response of
the United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, at 53-
62 (May 20, 1982).
62. Response of the United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification of
Final Judgment, at 57 (May 20, 1982).
tomorrow's technology, effectively to ensure fair competition.
Even if it were possible, moreover, effectively to monitor the
technical aspects of interconnection in an evolving technological
environment, there would remain still more subtle means of
discrimination in operational activities, such as the timely provision,
maintenance, testing, and restoration of facilities. In short, the
BOCs, if permitted to engage in competitive activities, would have
substantial ability to frustrate regulatory attempts to prevent
discriminatory conduct.63
The propriety of the line-of-business restrictions thus received
substantial attention in the extensive Tunney Act proceedings in the
first half of 1982.
At the end of this process, Judge Greene essentially approved
the decree that the parties had submitted.61 Before entering it,
however, he required the parties to add an additional section to the
MFJ to address various objections raised by interested third parties or
by Judge Greene himself during the Tunney Act proceedings. The
new section VIII of the MFJ did such miscellaneous but important
things as to permit the BOCs "to provide, but not manufacture,
customer premises equipment,"65 to permit them to produce yellow
page telephone directories,66 to forbid AT&T from engaging in
electronic publishing for seven years from entry of the MFJ,67 and to
63. Id. at 57-58.
64. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
65. MFJ § VIII(A), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231; see AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
191-93.
66. See MFJ § VIII(B), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231. The decision to
permit the RBOCs to produce yellow page directories was in large part based on the
concern in 1982 that the RBOCs might not be financially viable after divestiture and the
theory that the yellow pages would continue to be used to provide a subsidy to local
telephone rates. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 193-94. See generally TEMIN, supra note 5, at
283-91 (describing Tunney Act proceeding, including migration of yellow pages provision
from proposed congressional legislation to the MFJ). Not only did the post-divestiture
financial performance of the RBOCs relative to AT&T make this concern appear ironic in
retrospect, but the subsidy theory also turned out to be erroneous. See United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,433 (D.D.C. 1989) (explaining that
"once [yellow pages] authority had been transferred to them from AT&T, a number of the
Regional Companies set up their Yellow Pages operations in such a way that the profits
from those operations flowed not to the ratepaying public but to the companies' other,
more 'conglomerate' ventures"); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 581
n.252 (D.D.C. 1987) (to same effect), affd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.
1990); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 865-66 (D.D.C. 1984) (further
explication of same point), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
67. See MFJ § VIII(D), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
180-85. As section VIII(D) contemplated, this restriction was removed, at AT&T's
request, seven years after the entry of the MFJ. See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,673 (D.D.C. 1989).
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require court approval of the plan of reorganization. 68
The recurring post-divestiture significance of the additions
required by Judge Greene lay in his establishment of the standard for
removing the line-of-business restrictions imposed on the BOCs in
section II(D) of the MFJ. Section VIII(C) set forth this standard. In
the opinion accompanying his approval of the MFJ (conditional upon
the parties' agreeing to the addition of section VIII), Judge Greene
explained that the line-of-business restrictions should not be
permitted to outlive the premise upon which they were predicated.
This premise (which Judge Greene had ratified earlier in the opinion
in approving the line-of-business restrictions) was that the BOCs, if
permitted to enter the long-distance, manufacturing, or information-
services market (or, indeed, any market other than local exchange
service), would use their monopoly power over the local exchange
bottleneck to impede competition in the competitive market. But this
might not be true forever, Judge Greene noted:
It is probable that, over time, the Operating Companies will lose
the ability to leverage their monopoly power into the competitive
markets from which they must now be barred. This change could
occur as a result of technological developments which eliminate the
Operating Companies' local exchange monopoly or from changes
in the structures of the competitive markets.69
Judge Greene stated that he would therefore apply the same standard
in deciding whether to remove the restrictions that he had applied in
approving them. Thus he proposed section VIII(C) of the MFJ,
which provided in its entirety as follows: "The restrictions imposed
upon the separated BOCs by virtue of section 1(D) shall be removed
upon a showing by the petitioning BOC that there is no substantial
possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede
competition in the market it seeks to enter. '70
The parties quickly stipulated to section VIII, and on August 24,
1982, Judge Greene entered the MFJ.71 The ensuing sixteen months
were devoted to the largest corporate reorganization in history and to
associated legal matters. As part of this process, AT&T submitted to
the court the more than 160 local access and transport areas, or
LATAs, into which it proposed to divide the Bell System's territory.
These divisions were central to the post-divestiture provision of
telecommunications, for the BOCs were to provide intraLATA
communications and were restricted from providing interLATA
68. See MFJ § VIII(J), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 232; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
214-17.
69. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 194.
70. MFJ § VII(C), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231; see AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
195.
71. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
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communications (which would be the domain of long-distance
carriers such as AT&T and MCI).72 The court required some
modifications, but essentially approved the proposed LATAs.73
AT&T also submitted to the court a lengthy plan of reorganization,
which divided the Bell System's assets and functions between newly
created Regional Holding Companies, which would own the BOCs,
and the post-divestiture AT&T, which would provide long-distance
service and also own Western Electric and Bell Labs. Here, again,
the court approved the proposed plan of reorganization after certain
modifications. 74 Both the entry of the MFJ and the approval of the
plan of reorganization were summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court.75
72. See supra note 53.
73. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983).
74. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), affd
mem. sub norm California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). One modification was
Judge Greene's assignment of the "Bell" name and logo to the BOCs, as opposed to
AT&T. Although the Bell System's plan was for all the divested entities (both AT&T and
the RBOCs) to be able to use the Bell name and logo for certain purposes, Judge Greene
rejected this approach. He reasoned that "[t]he decree is designed to effect a radical
separation of the Operating Companies from AT&T" and that it therefore would "hardly
do to continue to have the various divested entities of the Bell System hold themselves out
as if they were all still part of the same complex." Id. at 1076-77. On this basis, Judge
Greene concluded that "the 'Bell' name and the Bell logo must belong either to AT&T or
to the Operating Companies-but not to both." Id. at 1077. Judge Greene then allocated
the Bell name and logo to the RBOCs, primarily on the ground that it would help to
ensure their financial viability. See id. at 1078-81; see also supra note 66 (explaining similar
rationale in yellow pages decision); KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 19, § 4.5, at 219-20 &
n.44 (providing succinct summary of modifications to plan of reorganization that Judge
Greene required).
75. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (summarily affirming entry of
MFJ); California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983) (summarily affirming approval of
plan of reorganization). Justice Rehnquist, joined by two other members of the Court,
dissented from the summary affirmance of the MFJ. He was concerned by the claim of
some states (such as Maryland) that the MFJ preempted certain of their regulation of the
telecommunications industry in contravention of the "state action" exemption from the
Sherman Act established by Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). More fundamentally, he suggested that
the Tunney Act's requirement that a district court make a determination whether entry of
an antitrust consent decree is "in the public interest," 15 U.S.C. § 16(e), might allocate a
non-judicial function to the court. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. at 1002-06
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist therefore would have declined to affirm
summarily, but would rather have set the appeals for oral argument. The Supreme Court's
action was the only appellate review of Judge Greene's entry of the MFJ and approval of
the plan of reorganization because these matters went directly to the Court from the
district court under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29(b). See United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,130 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1982) (certifying MFJ for
direct appeal under the Expediting Act); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1983-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,596 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 1983) (same for plan of reorganization); see also
United States v. AT&T, 714 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (after the Supreme Court's
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C. The World on January 1,1984
As of January 1, 1984, the Bell System belonged to history.
From the consumer's perspective, eight entities succeeded to its
various pieces. Seven of them were the new Regional Holding
Companies, which would be known by a variety of names and related
acronyms: Bell RHCs, Regional Bell Operating Companies or
RBOCs, Bell Companies, and Baby Bells. These new companies-
Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis,
Southwestern Bell, and U S West-owned the 22 BOCs that AT&T
had been required to divest. The BOCs and their RBOC owners
continued to be local exchange carriers, enjoying franchises granted
by various state regulators. They were excluded from essentially
every other market by the line-of-business restrictions in section
II(D) of the MFJ.
The eighth company was American Telephone and Telegraph or
AT&T. It retained virtually all of the components of the Bell System
that had been engaged in the competitive or potentially competitive
provision of products or services. The post-divestiture AT&T thus
possessed the basic long-distance facilities that had been operated by
AT&T Long Lines or the BOCs.76 It further retained the Bell
System's manufacturing arm, Western Electric, and its renowned
research facility, Bell Laboratories. The vertical integration binding
these components with the BOC monopolies by both ownership
interests and contract arrangements, however, had been eradicated.
A substantial part of the regulatory structure within which the
service providers operated was new. The Bell System's territory had
been divided into 164 LATAs.7 7 The BOCs would provide service
affirmance, dismissing separate appeal related to entry of the MFJ).
76. For a description of how the Bell System's integrated network was divided,
generally under a "predominant use" test, between exchange functions (assigned to the
post-divestiture BOCs) and interexchange functions (assigned to the post-divestiture
AT&T), see United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 199-200, 205-08, 226-27, 232
(D.D.C. 1982) (opinion concerning proposed MFJ and sections I(A) and VIII(G) of the
MFJ as entered), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-66 (D.D.C. 1983) (opinion
concerning proposed plan of reorganization), aff'd mem. sub nom. California v. United
States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange
Carriers, 12 FCC Rcd 7026, 7029-30, 7036-37 (1997) (explaining treatment under MFJ of
multifunction facilities through Shared Network Facilities Arrangements or "SNFAs").
77. Although the number of LATAs under the MFJ has been variously reported as
being 160, see KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 19, § 4.8, at 227 n.1, and as 163, see id. § 4.8, at
234, the correct number appears to be 164. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569
F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983) (taking AT&T's 161 proposed LATAs, eliminating three, and
creating six others); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983)
(considering further LATA questions, eliminating one LATA that had been judicially
created, recreating one that had been judicially eliminated, eliminating one other, and
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within the LATAs, but this area was not reserved to them by the
MFJ. InterLATA communications, by contrast, were to be provided
solely by long-distance carriers, which would also be known as
interexchange carriers.
H. Early Administration of the MFJ
The MFJ was designed to "allo[w] the more rapid and certain
development of competition in those telecommunications markets
where competition, in the present state of technology, is possible. '78
As recounted above, the means whereby the government-which had
basically dictated the terms of the MFJ-sought to accomplish this
goal was the structural separation of the Bell System and, as "the
opposite side of the divestiture coin," the line-of-business restrictions
on the RBOCs.79 The government contended that these provisions of
the MFJ would "remov[e], clearly and efficiently, the structural
problems that have given rise to the controversies between the
United States and AT&T over the [previous] three decades." 8
It soon became clear, however, that the antitrust and regulatory
controversies that preceded the MFJ would be replaced by
controversies under the MFJ.81  These new controversies can be
creating one other), affd mem. sub nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983).
The discrepancy between the number 163 and the actual number 164 may have arisen
because, in ordering the recreation of a LATA in Winchester, Kentucky, that he had
previously eliminated, compare Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 1034-35, 1057, with
Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 1105, 1130-31, Judge Greene required that the LATA
be "associat[ed] ... with the independent area around Lexington served by GTE." 569
F. Supp. at 1105 & n.210. Winchester was nonetheless a separate LATA. See id. at 1105
n.210,1130.
78. Competitive Impact Statement, at 8 (filed by the Department of Justice on Feb. 10,
1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170,7172 (Feb. 17,1982).
79. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text; Transcript at 25178-79 (June 29,
1982) (statement of James Denvir, Department of Justice attorney) (explaining that "[the
MFJ] contains two central remedies: [d]ivestiture and a ban on reintegration," noting that
the first remedy "completely solves the problem [for the present] of the incentives and
abilities that result when a firm is engaged in both regulated monopoly and competitive
markets," and stating that the second remedy did the same for the future and that thus,
"[iln a very real sense, the [line-of-business] restrictions are simply the opposite side of the
divestiture coin, they are an integral part of the divestiture and proceed on precisely the
same theory that divestiture proceeds on").
80. Competitive Impact Statement, at 8 (filed by the Department of Justice on Feb. 10,
1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170,7172 (Feb. 17,1982).
81. In addition to the United States' lawsuit, numerous private antitrust actions were
filed against the Bell System prior to its break-up in 1984 (although, of course, the MFJ
did not terminate these private suits). See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1375-77;
see, e.g., Essential Communications, Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979); Litton
Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T,
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980,
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grouped into two basic types. Some were inevitable: The
reorganization of the Bell System was the largest and most complex
corporate reorganization ever. Thus, even though the reorganization
lasted some sixteen months, some issues either had not been
addressed or had not been resolved to all parties' satisfaction by the
time of divestiture. Other controversies arose not because the MFJ
or the reorganization had been silent on some points, but rather
because they had been quite specific on one point-these
controversies arose, that is, because the newborn RBOCs chafed at
the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions and wanted to expand beyond
local telephony. Perhaps these controversies were inevitable, too, but
if so for a different reason: viz., that any attempt to limit the fields in
which powerful businesses may compete is bound to meet resistance
and provoke controversy.s2
A. Early Skirmishes
Many of the early skirmishes among the parties to the MFJ
required Judge Greene's attention because the underlying issues had
not been adequately dealt with in the reorganization or because
aspects of the reorganization collided with the larger world.
Although such differences of opinion among the parties needed to be
resolved, they did not, in retrospect, create major fault lines for which
Judge Greene can now be criticized.
Some of these unanticipated problems arose even before
divestiture was complete on January 1, 1984. For example, AT&T
(still speaking for the Bell System, including its subsidiary BOCs)
filed a request with the district court in 1983 seeking a waiver of the
MFJ's interLATA restriction insofar as it applied to cellular
telephone calls.8 3 When the Department of Justice opposed the
request, the BOCs' petition, as Judge Greene would later state, was
983 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Indeed, the existence of these suits and the likelihood of a
continuation of similar private suits in seeming perpetuity were among the reasons that
AT&T agreed to the MFJ. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1376,1407 & n.381.
82. Cf. TEMIN, supra note 5, at 215 (recounting pessimistic comment of Department of
Justice economist involved in Quagmire I settlement negotiations that "incentives would
always win out over injunctions").
83. The Bell System's cellular assets had been allocated to the post-divestiture BOCs.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 643, 644 n.4 (D.D.C. 1983). The
primary component of these assets, which were just then being deployed to offer services
to the public, generally consisted of one of the two cellular licenses for each area where
the BOCs provided local telephone service. The FCC had created two cellular licenses for
various areas in the country, and, in order to ensure the speedy deployment of cellular
services, it reserved one license for the local wireline carrier (which in most of the country
was a BOC). See An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 482-83 (1981) (subsequent history
omitted).
either clarified or modified, depending upon the point of view.84
Whatever the scope of the original petition, the revised request for a
waiver was merely "to construct and operate [cellular] systems... in
only nine specific geographic areas," each of which constituted one
metropolitan complex but spread beyond a single LATA.85 Although
the Department of Justice continued to oppose the request, Judge
Greene granted the waiver, subject to various conditions, after
concluding that under those conditions the RBOCs had satisfied the
section VIII(C) standard of demonstrating that there was no
substantial possibility that they would be able to impede competition
in the interLATA or mobile radio service markets. This ruling in
some ways seems dubious in light of later rulings that "piecemeal"
waivers of the MFJ would not be permitted,86 but it must also be
noted that the ruling favored the restricted BOCs. In all events, it
was, as Judge Greene stated at the time, a "pragmatic" approach
designed to address a problem that arose as the divestiture date
loomed.87
Not all controversies were as potentially economically significant
as the application of the long-distance restriction to cellular telephony
or were brought to the court by the parties. In November 1983, with
divestiture less than two months away, Judge Greene requested that
the parties "apprise [the court] of the [post-divestiture] plans of the
various entities regarding the provision of time and weather
information to the public and as to the legal status of such plans."88
Although it may seem a distant memory in this era of "900 service"
and "976 calls," the BOCs traditionally had provided time and
weather information to their local customers at no charge (or none
beyond the cost of a local telephone call). Those services, however,
fell within the MFJ's "information services" line-of-business
restriction.89 Judge Greene proceeded to grant a waiver of the MFJ
to permit time and weather announcements by the BOCs after
divestiture.
Judge Greene's apparent purpose in the time-and-weather ruling
was to ensure against any subsequent public criticism that the MFJ
had required the BOCs to abandon these services. He stated at the
end of his analysis that, "[i]n view of the waiver, if any telephone
company ceases to provide time and weather services, that would be
its own business decision, and the decree would simply be an excuse
84. See Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. at 647.
85. Id. at 647-48.
86. Cf. infra note 193 and accompanying text.
87. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. at 652-53.
88. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 658,658 (D.D.C. 1983).
89. See supra note 55.
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for an action which the company decided to take for its own
commercial reasons." 9 And, lest there be any possibility that Judge
Greene had not covered himself, he went on to state that "[i]n that
respect the use made of the decree would be similar to its use by some
local companies as a justification for substantial rate increases." 91
Although here, too, the section VIII(C) analysis of the "market" the
BOCs would be entering by virtue of the waiver lacked the
sophistication that would accompany later waiver requests and
decisions, the time-and-weather ruling both favored the BOCs and
was a one-time action that attempted to ensure a minimum of
disruption of public expectations as divestiture loomed.
Of course, Judge Greene did not always rule in favor of the
BOCs. One notable contrary instance was an eve-of-divestiture
motion by the Department of Justice seeking to amend the plan of
reorganization and to permit a temporary waiver of the MFJ's
interexchange restriction. The Department's goal was to require
AT&T to make available to the RBOCs its common channel
interoffice signalling ("CCIS") database so that the RBOCs could
sort and route the "800 Service" calls of interexchange carriers other
than AT&T.92 This sophisticated new database enabled AT&T to
offer "800 Service" subscribers innovative service offerings such as
use of 800 numbers with verbal significance (e.g., 800-CAR-RENT)
and time-of-day routing (e.g., sending a call to a company's West
90. Western Elea Co., 578 F. Supp. at 660 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 660 n.10. During the Tunney Act proceedings, there was a substantial
amount of concern that divestiture would cause rates to rise for local telephone service.
See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 188-89 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also supra notes 66, 74 (noting
reassignment of yellow pages authority and Bell name and logo to RBOCs largely based
on this concern). The parties and the court maintained that neither divestiture nor the
line-of-business restrictions would have any such effect. See, e.g., United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1120 (D.D.C. 1983), affd mem. sub nom. California v. United
States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983).
In this regard, it may also be noted that after divestiture, when Judge Greene invoked
concerns about local rates in deciding requests for waivers of the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions, the D.C. Circuit held that this approach was generally improper. See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court of appeals
conceded that in 1982 the Department of Justice had urged Judge Greene to consider the
interests of local ratepayers in evaluating and implementing the MFJ, but the court
explained that the MFJ's design was to ensure the development of competition in markets
such as long distance and manufacturing, not to protect local ratepayers. See id. (stating
that "we see no clear evidence that ratepayer protection was part of the 'contemporaneous
understandings of [the decree's] purposes"' and that "[c]oncern for the ratepayers' welfare
is primarily the responsibility of the FCC and state regulators, not the district court")
(quoting United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); infra
text accompanying notes 170-72.
92. See United States v. AT&T, 604 F. Supp. 316,318 (D.D.C. 1985).
Coast office after the close of business on the East Coast).
Judge Greene denied the Department's motion to require AT&T
to make the CCIS database available to the RBOCs. He reasoned
that using the RBOCs as a centralized purveyor of non-monopoly
services to interexchange companies was incompatible with the MFJ,
for "cost-benefit analysis by the interexchange carriers in deciding
whether, where, when, and how to offer various sorts of
interexchange service is precisely what is contemplated by the
decree."93 The MFJ's purpose was not to punish AT&T or to remove
all competitive disadvantages other interexchange carriers might
suffer, but only to eliminate those advantages that AT&T had
enjoyed because of its control over the BOC monopolies.94
Interexchange carriers wishing to compete with the post-divestiture
AT&T would have to do so "by developing their own technology and
marketing strategy."95 The desire for a competitive interexchange
market thus was necessarily leading to more rulings under the MFJ
not against AT&T, but rather against the RBOCs to the extent that
they were seeking to get into that market.96
One brief ruling less than two weeks before divestiture reflects
Judge Greene's desire both to administer the MFJ after divestiture in
accordance with basic legal principles and, correlatively, not to be
engaged in "unwarranted interference with the operations of the
various Bell System units." 97 This was Judge Greene's termination of
the intervenor status that he had granted to more than 100 entities in
the course of the Tunney Act proceeding. The court made clear that,
after divestiture, the Department of Justice, AT&T, and the divested
93. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Judge Greene also ruled against one of the RBOCs in an eve-of-divestiture dispute
between Bell Atlantic and AT&T over a contract that Bell Atlantic had entered into with
the federal government's General Services Administration ("GSA"). Under the
contract's terms, Bell Atlantic agreed to sell to GSA embedded customer premises
equipment (e.g., telephones) located on the government's property in the Bell Atlantic
area pursuant to a lease from the Bell System. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578
F. Supp. 680, 681 (D.D.C. 1983). Bell Atlantic also committed to provide "follow on"
services with respect to maintaining this customer premises equipment and on this basis
intended to retain several hundred Bell System employees who otherwise would have
been reassigned to AT&T upon divestiture. See id. at 680. With respect to the sales
agreement, Judge Greene had difficulty pinpointing provisions in the MFJ or plan of
reorganization that this contract contravened, see id. at 681-83, but he was not similarly
constrained in finding that "Bell Atlantic's actions ... represent a plain violation of [the
MFJ's] design, [itsl purposes" concerning the marketing of customer premises equipment,
id. at 684. This pre-divestiture tussle foreshadowed the scores of post-divestiture
controversies between AT&T and the RBOCs over the scope of the RBOCs' permissible
activities.
97. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 677,679 (D.D.C. 1983).
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RBOCs all retained their rights, granted by the MFJ, to request court
action. And third parties could continue to respond to motions. But
the termination of the third parties' status as intervenors meant most
prominently that they would be required to apply to the Department
of Justice for enforcement of the MFJ, and the court would thereafter
consider their application only if they "demonstrate[d] to the Court
that, although the application is meritorious, the Department has
refused, in bad faith, to commence enforcement proceedings. ' 98 This
ruling was surely appropriate as a legal matter. Furthermore, as a
contextual matter, perhaps Judge Greene understood, as divestiture
loomed, that post-divestiture life would be complicated enough with
just nine parties to the MFJ (the government, AT&T, and the seven
RBOCs).
B. Waivers of the Line-of-Business Restrictions
Matters were about to get even more complicated: the RBOCs
were poised to launch a series of small-scale assaults on the line-of-
business restrictions. These took the form of motions for "waivers"
of the MFJ to permit particular activities.
The first wave of waiver requests came shortly after the RBOCs'
January 1, 1984 birth date. Within four months of that date, the
RBOCs had filed nine requests for waivers of the MFJ's line-of-
business restrictions. The RBOCs sought to engage in activities
ranging from real-estate services to providing interexchange service
for NASA.99 Most of the RBOCs' waiver requests implicated the
MFJ's catch-all line-of-business restriction, which essentially limited
the RBOCs to providing local telecommunications service and access
service, although one of the requests ran up against the more specific
restriction on interexchange services.1°° It was also clear that more
waiver requests were on their way.10'
Judge Greene did not hesitate to make known his surprise and
displeasure at the pace and scope of these requests. In mid-1984, he
collected the various RBOC waiver requests together and issued a
decision disposing of the motions. The decision expressed Judge
Greene's dismay at the series of waiver requests:
No one connected with the negotiation, the drafting, or the
modification of the decree envisioned that the Regional Holding
Companies would seek to enter new competitive markets on a
broad scale within a few months, let alone a few weeks after
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846,850-51 n.3 (D.D.C. 1984),
appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
100. See id. at 868-69; Western Elec Co., 777 F.2d at 24-25.
101. See Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 850.
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divestitu[re]-before the implementation of equal access and
before the companies' commitment to an efficient and economical
telephone operation could be tested.102
Judge Greene does not appear to have been motivated in these
comments by a simplistic "big is bad" mentality. His opinion and his
previous comments made clear his lack of concern as to whether
AT&T, larger than any single RBOC, engaged in any business that it
might like, and this disparate treatment was sound under the theory
of the MFJ. "The reason is simple: [the RBOCs], unlike AT&T,
retain what is in law and in reality a monopoly over a critical aspect of
the nation's telephone service."'10 3  Judge Greene's primary
motivation was a concern that the RBOCs were becoming
increasingly interested in, and devoting substantial resources to, lines
of business having nothing to do with local telecommunications and
that this unexpected focus would mean, among other things, a lack of
commitment to implementing the MFJ's equal access provision.10 4
Notwithstanding Judge Greene's unhappiness with the
unexpected state of events, the primary action taken in this mid-1984
opinion was not the rejection of most of the pending requests but
rather the establishment of procedures for handling these and any
subsequent RBOC requests for waivers of the line-of-business
restrictions.10 5 These procedures required the RBOCs to submit any
102. Id. at 858.
103. Id. at 874. For other statements explaining the disparate treatment of the RBOCs
and post-divestiture AT&T, see, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 170-86
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
Reply Brief of the United States, at 19-26 (June 24, 1982); Brief of the United States in
Response to the Court's Memorandum of May 25, 1982, at 37-52 (June 14,1982).
104. See, e.g., Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 859 ("[T]his Court which.., was
directly involved in approving the decree and in defining its meaning-which, indeed,
drafted and required the parties to incorporate section VIII(C)-did not have the slightest
belief or intention that within a very short period of time, the Regional Holding
Companies would seek to transform themselves from custodians of the nation's local
telephone service into conglomerates for which such service was at best a pedestrian
sideline."); id. at 861-67 (section of opinion concerning RBOC provision of local
telephone service, commenting that "the vast and diverse [other] programs the Regional
Holding Companies are formulating, and the priorities the companies seem to be assigning
to these programs, constitute a serious threat to their obligations under the decree and the
implementing documents").
105. The establishment of procedures was not the only action taken. Judge Greene
denied the one pending request for a waiver to provide interexchange services (viz.,
BellSouth's motion in connection with a bid to provide telecommunications services and
products to NASA) and stated that "[t]he Court will not even consider the substantive
merits of a waiver request seeking permission to provide interexchange services until such
time as the Regional Holding Companies lose their bottleneck monopolies and there is
substantial competition in local telecommunications service." Id. at 868. He then tersely
stated: "That is not now." Id. Similar statements were made of the information-services
and manufacturing markets, for "[n]o significant technological or structural changes have
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.501426
August 1999] TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNDER JUDGE GREENE
requests for a waiver of the line-of-business restrictions to the
Department of Justice. The Department would then conduct an
analysis of the request, including consulting with interested parties. If
the Department concluded that the RBOC had met its burden under
the section VIII(C) standard, the Department would file a motion
with the court requesting the waiver. If the government did not reach
that conclusion, it would nonetheless send the RBOC's request to the
court, together with the Department's own comments and any
supporting and opposing materials it had received.1°6
The RBOCs and their supporters roundly criticized these
procedures. But the procedures were quite defensible in theory.
First, the Department of Justice, as the "Prime Mover" of the
litigation and the MFJ, in all events would be involved in any
proceeding concerning the line-of-business restrictions. Thus, the
mere requirement of a Justice Department analysis and
recommendation affords little ground for criticism. Second, the
parties themselves had agreed to the line-of-business restrictions,
which thus constituted part of a final judgment. Affording the party
that had insisted on the restrictions' inclusion in the judgment a
particular opportunity to formulate its position on a request for relief
from the judgment seems reasonable. Finally, it could be argued that
the requirement that waivers of the line-of-business restrictions be
funnelled through the Department of Justice served the same
interests as had the Tunney Act proceeding in which those
restrictions had been approved. The Tunney Act was passed to bring
proposed antitrust consent decrees into the sunshine-to create a
mechanism for informed public commentary. 10 7 Public commentary is
no less desirable on proposed waivers of approved consent decrees (if
anything, it is even more desirable, given that the decrees have
already been affirmatively found to be "in the public interest").
Referral of RBOC waiver requests to the Department of Justice,
occurred in these markets to justify a relaxation of these line of business restrictions." Id.
This varying treatment of catch-all waiver requests and those directed at the long-distance,
manufacturing, and information-services bans makes sense because each of the latter line-
of-business restrictions tends to correspond to a discrete antitrust market whereas the
"catch-all" provision does not.
106. See id. at 873-74; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civ. No. 82-0192
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 1986) (modifying procedure to provide for approval of "me too" waiver
requests where one RBOC sought a waiver along lines of a waiver another RBOC had
already obtained); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14799
(D.D.C. July 30, 1991) (modifying procedure in light of D.C. Circuit's triennial review
decision so that, following Justice Department's investigation, petitioning RBOC would
present its own waiver motion to the court).
107. See Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 MICH. L. REV. 153, 160-62 (1983) (and sources
cited).
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which would then notify the public on a weekly basis of pending
waiver requests, created a mechanism, akin to the Tunney Act, for
public notice and afforded the opportunity for the public to lobby a
more appropriate body than the district court.
At least at this point in the tenure of the MFJ, the waiver
procedures were defensible in practice as well. The RBOCs amended
their waiver requests to conform to four structural safeguards that
Judge Greene had announced that he would require for waiver of the
catch-all restriction.08 When the Department of Justice returned six
of the eight requests to the court and recommended their approval,
Judge Greene approved all six.'09 The RBOCs withdrew the two
requests that the Justice Department indicated that it would not
support.110 All of this was accomplished in less than six months. It
was clear thus far that, where the parties could work out their
differences, Judge Greene would not seek to overturn their
agreement."'
The other major decision concerning the line-of-business
restrictions within the first three years of divestiture was handed
down in early 1986.112 The decision grouped together and disposed of
a number of RBOC motions, not so much for waivers of the MFJ, as
for "clarification[s]."" 3 This proceeding merits extended discussion,
for it provides a representative snapshot of the Department of
Justice's approach to the MFJ in the years immediately after
divestiture, and it additionally affords revealing insights into Judge
Greene's conception of the MFJ. The particular motions before the
court sought rulings on whether, absent a section VIII(C) waiver, the
MFJ barred the RBOCs from providing "shared tenant services"
(where a developer or building owner would hire the RBOCs or
another carrier to provide telecommunications and related services,
including the selection of long-distance carriers, to unrelated tenants
on a shared centralized basis) or from providing basic exchange
service or cellular telephone service outside of their regions (e.g.,
108. These were, as later summarized by the court of appeals, "(1) the establishment of
separate subsidiaries; (2) guarantees that the competitive enterprises would obtain their
own debt financing on their own credit; (3) limitation of estimated net revenues of the
proposed competitive enterprises to 10% of the [RBOCs'] total estimated net revenues;
and (4) submission to [Justice Department) monitoring of the enterprises." United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23,25 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted).
109. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 604 F. Supp. 256,260-66 (D.D.C. 1984).
110. See id. at 259 n.14.
111. One of the RBOCs (U S West) appealed Judge Greene's order establishing these
procedures for considering line-of-business waiver requests. The D.C. Circuit (Bork, J.)
dismissed the appeal as not being from a final judgment. See Western Elec. Co., 777 F.2d
at 24.
112. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090 (D.D.C. 1986).
113. Id. at 1093.
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whether midwestern-based Ameritech could provide such service in
California)." 4
The Department of Justice opposed the RBOCs with regard to
shared tenant services. In its opposition, the Department set forth
what it termed "the fundamental lesson" of the MFJ, which included
the proposition "that, given both the ability and the incentive to
hinder a competitor's access, the local exchange company, despite the
best efforts of regulators and courts, can be expected to find a means
of impeding its competitors' access to local exchange customers."'n S
It then explained: "Thus, the key feature of the decree is that it
contains a structural remedy, and not a behavioral or regulatory
approach, to the anticompetitive conditions that had existed within
the telecommunications industry."" 6  The Department was more
equivocal on the question whether the MFJ permitted the RBOCs to
provide extraregional exchange service.117
Judge Greene was unequivocal. He denied all of the motions for
clarification and ruled that the RBOCs needed waivers of the MFJ in
order to participate in the activities they proposed. Before doing so,
he set forth some general considerations that undergirded his ruling.
At its core, Judge Greene wrote, the MFJ was the insurance that a
telecommunications company with the ability to impede competition
in competitive markets through cross-subsidization and
discrimination-by use of a bottleneck monopoly-did not have the
incentive to use that ability." 8 This was Judge Greene's consistent
view of the MFJ's purpose, and it was later endorsed by the D.C.
Circuit." 9
114. See id. at 1093 n.1. Another motion presented a third issue: viz., whether the
RBOCs could provide voice storage and retrieval services to cellular customers. See id.
115. Response of the United States to Ameritech's Motion for Clarification and Waiver
of the Decree Regarding the Provision of Shared Telecommunications and Other Services,
at 2-3 (June 29, 1984).
116. Id. at 3-4.
117. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(discussing Department's position).
118. Judge Greene noted that the BOCs' bottleneck monopolies "merely changed
hands" at divestiture. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1095.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 855-58 & nn.28-38
(D.D.C. 1984) (and cases cited). The D.C. Circuit subsequently held that ambiguous
provisions in the MFJ should be construed by reference to the MFJ's purposes (or, more
accurately, the parties' jointly intended purposes), particularly as reflected in the
Department of Justice's Competitive Impact Statement and other parts of the Tunney Act
proceeding. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 1387, 1390-95 & n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1427-30 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283,297 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (purpose of the
MFJ cannot overcome its text); cf. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 154 F.R.D. 1, 6-7
(D.D.C. 1994) (denying AT&T's motion for declaratory ruling because, regardless of
MFJ's purpose, literal language of section I(D) stood in the way); United States v.
Judge Greene was on solid legal ground in this early 1986
decision in ruling that the RBOCs could not offer "shared tenant
services" without a waiver of the MFJ. Shared tenant services were
themselves, or at least included, interexchange services, and Judge
Greene's discussion is a trenchant and succinct analysis, in a specific
context, of the dangers of RBOC involvement in the interexchange
market. 20 Under their plan, the RBOCs at a minimum would be
aggregating demand within a building and on that basis purchasing
bulk interexchange service for resale, just as an interexchange reseller
would do, and the RBOCs would therefore necessarily be selecting
interexchange carriers for their shared tenant customers. This latter
component of shared tenant services was particularly problematic
because it posed a substantial threat to the MFJ's equal access
provision-the requirement that the RBOCs treat all interexchange
carriers on an evenhanded basis. As Judge Greene stated, "it is clear
that the functions involved-the selection of carriers and the
procurement of interexchange services-constitute integral parts of
the interexchange business," and that, if they performed these
functions, the RBOCs "would be directly competing with the
interexchange carriers for that business. '12'
Unlike his approach to the catch-all restriction, Judge Greene's
attitude toward the MFJ's interexchange restriction was categorical:
the shared tenant services ruling once again indicated that he was not
willing to permit RBOC involvement in long distance. This was
entirely consistent with the ruling, a year and a half earlier, in which
Judge Greene had indicated that he was receptive to properly
Western Elec. Co., 131 F.R.D. 647, 649, 652 (1990) (discussing interrelation of MFJ's
language and purpose in context of RBOC request for declaratory ruling or, in the
alternative, waiver), afj'd, 969 F.2d 1231 ( 992).
120. See Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1095-96.
121. Id. at 1102. Like the question of RBOC provision of extraregional exchange
services, which was part of the same opinion, the question of shared tenant services was
appealed to the D.C. Circuit. On this latter question, however, the court of appeals
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, for the company (Ameritech) that had sought the
shared tenant services ruling from Judge Greene did not appeal and U S West (which had
not sought such a ruling but nonetheless had appealed) was held to lack standing to raise
the question on appeal. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1092 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). The D.C. Circuit's decision is also notable because it rejected U S West's claim
that the MFJ did not bind the RBOCs (i.e., the Regional Holding Companies or "RHCs").
See id. at 1087-89. U S West had argued, among other things, that the application to the
RBOCs of the MFJ (including most notably the line-of-business restrictions) violated due
process because the RBOCs did not have separate representation when the MFJ was
agreed to. The court of appeals dismissively pointed out that the BOCs were wholly
owned subsidiaries of AT&T at the time of the MFJ's negotiation, entry, and
implementation, and it noted that "US West cites no authority.., for the remarkable
proposition that a parent may not bind its wholly owned subsidiaries without affording
them independent legal representation." Id. at 1087-88.
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conditioned catch-all waiver requests, but would "not even consider"
requests for waivers of the interexchange, manufacturing, and
information-services restrictions so long as the RBOCs continued to
possess bottleneck monopolies.1 22
Judge Greene's denial in this 1986 decision of RBOC authority
to offer out-of-region exchange and cellular service was less
supportable, and the D.C. Circuit reversed him on this point.123 In
this regard, what is notable about Judge Greene's "general
considerations" adverted to above was the depth of his unhappiness
with the RBOCs' expanding interests beyond-and, in his view, at the
expense of-local telephony. The following passage, in which Judge
Greene explains his statement that notwithstanding their smaller size
the RBOCs may present "dangers to competition that are in some
respects even greater than those presented by th[e] [Bell] System," is
particularly striking:
AT & T was imbued with a service mentality, a tradition dating
from the days of the chairmanship of Theodore Vail and continued
through that of John deButts and Charles Brown. Although the
company may have engaged in some or all of the anticompetitive
activities with which it was charged, the balance wheel of the
service tradition was always present. By contrast, the Regional
Companies, or some of them, indicate by their public statements,
their advertisements, and their rush to diversification, combined
with their relative lack of interest in basic telephone service itself,
that an ascent into the ranks of conglomerate America rates far
higher on their list of priorities than the provision of the best and
least costly local telephone service to the American public.
Anyone faced with the prospect of permitting these companies to
enter competitive markets, particularly the interexchange and the
information markets, would therefore have to exercise considerable
caution lest the companies be empowered, even encouraged, to use
their local monopoly advantage as a means to decimate the
competition in these markets and thus to enhance further their
conglomerate ambitions.124
Judge Greene's conception that the RBOCs should behave as
traditional public utility companies was the premise for his ruling that
the MFJ prohibited the RBOCs from offering local exchange service
outside of their home regions. His textual basis was section II(D)'s
provision that, in addition to being unable to engage in long distance,
information services, or manufacturing, the RBOCs might not
"provide any other product or service, except exchange
telecommunications and exchange access service, that is not a natural
122. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 868 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see supra note 105.
123. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082,1089-92 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
124. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1095-96 (footnotes omitted).
monopoly service actually regulated by tariff."'2 This catch-all
provision did not specify that the RBOCs could provide the
contemplated exchange and exchange access services only in
particular areas, but Judge Greene so interpreted it.
Although Judge Greene's interpretation was plausible, and he
set forth eight different reasons for concluding that the RBOCs were
intended to be limited to their franchised local areas in providing
service, one of these reasons especially stands out as reflective of the
traditional conception of a public utility company in the
telecommunications context. The court explained that the policy
underlying the MFJ supported the ruling:
The conclusion that the local companies may not engage in
exchange telecommunications outside their own areas is also
supported by policy underlying the decree. In order to maintain a
stable and effective national telecommunications network, the
local companies must work cooperatively in many areas. Together
they play an important role in the support of national security and
emergency preparedness functions, and they participate in the
establishment of national network standards. Competition among
these companies with respect to exchange service could, and no
doubt in short order would, reduce their incentive to cooperate in
these vital areas and thus jeopardize both the quality of the services
provided by the national telecommunications network as well as
the national defense and emergency requirements of that
network. 26
This ruling reflects Judge Greene's difficulty in accepting that the
MFJ was not designed to cement into place the original paradigm of
regulated industries law where one local telecommunications carrier
had a monopoly right to provide service in each area.127 As the D.C.
Circuit properly found in reversing, the United States' case (and the
MFJ) took no position on whether local service would always be a
natural monopoly. The MFJ was addressed to a world in which local
service was provided on a monopoly basis, but even Judge Greene's
section VIII(C) had explicitly contemplated that this premise might
not remain true forever.
In all events, it was clear by the end of 1986 from the foregoing
decisions that the RBOCs were making substantial headway toward
removal of the catch-all restriction but virtually no progress toward
removal of the other line-of-business restrictions. And as happy as
the RBOCs were to be free to engage in real-estate financing, to
provide office equipment, to provide consulting services to foreign
125. MFJ § II(D)(3), reprinted in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,228 (D.D.C.
1982), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)
126. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1108.
127. For an expansion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 251-56.
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telecommunications systems, or to do any number of things for which
they had received waivers of the catch-all restriction, none of these
was their main desire. They wanted the core long-distance,
manufacturing, and information-services restrictions removed, and
they were poised to launch an all-out assault on those bans in the
"triennial review" that had just gotten underway. The RBOCs were
about to obtain a surprising new ally in their struggle: the plaintiff in
the action, the United States Department of Justice.
M. The Triennial Review
At the time that the district court considered whether to enter
the MFJ in 1982, all principals recognized that the line-of-business
restrictions at some point might cease to be guarantors of competition
and instead become anticompetitive. This would happen, of course, if
the RBOCs ceased to possess monopoly control over local
bottlenecks to which companies such as long-distance carriers needed
access. 128 In that event, the line-of-business restrictions should be
removed. Cessante ratione legis-the theory went-cessat et ipsa lex.
The Department of Justice therefore announced during the
Tunney Act proceedings that it would "undertak[e] to report to the
Court every three years concerning the continuing need for the
restrictions imposed by the decree."1 29 To conduct this "triennial
review," as the process would come to be called, the Department of
Justice planned to submit the contemplated report to the court in
January 1987, which was three years after the divestiture occurred
and the line-of-business restrictions took effect. Although the
Department essentially met this goal it had set for itself (filing the
report on February 2, 1987), it is not likely that the Department or
anyone else in the process anticipated that judicial proceedings
involving the triennial review would not be completed for another
seven years.
A. The Role and Report of the Department of Justice
The triennial review was a substantial undertaking. Throughout
1986, the Department of Justice utilized its authority under the
visitatorial provisions of section VI of the MFJ to obtain information
128. Such loss of monopoly control over local bottlenecks could happen in one of two
ways: the RBOCs' local exchanges could altogether cease to be monopolies for local calls
as a result of technological developments, or they could remain monopolies for local calls
but bypass or other developments could mean that they were no longer bottlenecks
through which long-distance calls needed to pass. See United States v. AT&T, 552
F. Supp. 131, 194 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
129. Id. at 195.
from the RBOCs and AT&T concerning the state of competition in
both the local telephone markets and the markets from which the
RBOCs were excluded. The Justice Department also permitted
interested non-parties such as MCI and Sprint to submit their views
on the line-of-business restrictions. In addition, the Department
hired Peter W. Huber to serve as a consultant. Huber, who holds a
Ph.D. in mechanical engineering as well as a law degree, was detailed
to submit to the Department a report that addressed the state of
competition in the local telephone industry. All of this was in
anticipation of the Department's 1987 report to the court, the
purpose of which presumably was to assess whether in fact
circumstances had changed along the lines discussed in 1982.
The Department filed its report with the court on February 2,
1987.130 This document was submitted under the leadership of
Charles F. Rule, who had been appointed to head the Department of
Justice's antitrust division in late 1986. The lengthy report
recommended substantial changes in the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions. Although some of the Department's recommendations
pointed in the same direction as Judge Greene's administration of the
MFJ had been heading for the previous three years, others were
decided departures from that direction.
Least controversial was the Department's recommendation that
the catch-all restriction be removed from the MFJ. This prohibition,
which kept the RBOCs out of non-telecommunications activities by
restricting them to the provision of tariffed local exchange services,
had been the subject of repeated waiver requests since the RBOCs
had been divested on January 1, 1984.131 The Department contended
that there was a minimal risk of RBOC anticompetitive conduct (e.g.,
cross-subsidization and discrimination) in connection with non-
telecommunications activities.
The Department further recommended that the MFJ's
restrictions on RBOC involvement in information services and in
manufacturing be eliminated. The government took the position that
regulation could control the RBOCs' ability to use their local
exchange facilities to disadvantage competitors in these competitive
markets. In these circumstances, the Department suggested, the
categorical prohibitions contained in the MFJ were inappropriate.
As for the MFJ's most economically significant line-of-business
restriction, the Department took an only slightly more cautious
approach. It recommended that the interexchange restriction be
130. Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of
Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of
Final Judgment (Feb. 2,1987).
131. See, e.g., supra notes 99-101, 108-11 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.50
August 1999] TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNDER JUDGE GREENE
immediately lifted insofar as it prohibited the RBOCs from providing
so-called "extra-regional" long-distance service-i.e., interLATA
calls originating outside of their home regions' 32 -or from offering
long-distance service to cellular or other mobile customers. Each of
these interexchange proposals constituted a reversal of the
Department's previous stance. Further, and more extraordinarily, the
Justice Department recommended removing the interexchange
restriction altogether as soon as various state public utility
commissions eliminated state-imposed restrictions on entry into local
telephony.133 In other words, the Department suggested that the
restrictions could and should be removed even if the RBOCs
continued to possess local exchange facilities that were de facto
bottlenecks (but not de jure monopolies) for long-distance calls.
More than 170 entities filed papers in the district court in the
briefing process that followed the government's report and
recommendations. The other parties to the MFJ, of course, lined up
in accordance with their economic interests. AT&T opposed removal
of the restrictions on manufacturing and interexchange service
(AT&T's core businesses) and took no position on the information-
services and catch-all restrictions. The RBOCs supported the Justice
Department's recommendation, except where the Department did
not go far enough for their liking: some RBOCs thus filed their own
motions for complete and immediate removal of the interexchange
restriction.134  Interested non-parties were allowed to submit
comments as well; these entities ranged from companies with which
the RBOCs would compete if permitted to enter the closed-off lines
of business (such as information service providers and long-distance
companies along the lines of MCI and Sprint), to government entities
such as the states and the FCC, to consumer organizations such as the
Consumer Federation of America. These entities, too, lined up in
accordance with their economic or political interests, although it may
132 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 114, 117, 126 (discussing extraregional
intraLATA services).
133. See Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of
Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of
Final Judgment, at 71-103 (Feb. 2,1987).
134. There was some variation among the RBOCs' positions. Compare, e.g., Motion of
Bell Atlantic to Remove Portions of the Line of Business Restrictions Contained in the
AT&T Consent Decree (Apr. 27, 1987) (seeking partial interexchange relief) and
BellSouth Corporation's Motion for Relief Under Section 1(D) of the Modification of
Final Judgment (Apr. 27, 1987) (same) with, e.g., Motion of NYNEX Corporation to
Remove Restrictions Imposed by Section II(D) of the Modification of Final Judgment
(Apr. 27, 1987) (seeking unconditional removal of interexchange restriction and all other
restrictions) and Motion of Pacific Telesis Group for Waiver of the Line of Business
Restrictions (Apr. 27, 1987) (seeking complete though not unconditional removal of
restrictions).
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be said that the more aggressive motions to remove the line-of-
business restrictions found little support. 135
The Department's interexchange proposal came in for particular
criticism, and the Department substantially modified the proposal in
the triennial review briefing process in the Spring of 1987.136 As
finally submitted to the court for decision, the Department dropped
the proposal that the RBOCs be permitted immediately to provide
extraregional long-distance services and, under certain conditions, to
provide such services within their respective regions. In its place, the
Department requested that the district court permit the RBOCs to
provide long-distance services on cellular calls and that the court
consider extraregional and in-region proposals on a case-by-case
waiver basis and not in the "general" proceeding of the triennial
review.137 The Department stood by its proposals to remove the
catch-all, manufacturing, and information-services restrictions.
As a purely economic or public policy matter, the Department's
proposals were rational. Vertical integration in the tele-
communications industry had been lawful until the MFJ, and
American telecommunications services had become the most
advanced and widely available in the world. While the Department
of Justice had litigated against the Bell System to end the most
substantial vertical integration in the industry, and the results seemed
to many (perhaps most) to be favorable, it could not be suggested
that the now-prevailing view at the Justice Department-viz., that the
benefits of vertical integration outweighed the costs-was simply
untenable.138
135. For example, as Judge Greene stated, the request by some RBOCs for removal in
toto of the interexchange restriction was "supported by almost none of the other over one
hundred seventy entities that have filed papers in this proceeding except the Federal
Communications Commission." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 546
(D.D.C. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The FCC's
position merits further note, for its stance, though unusual as among the entities
participating in the triennial review, was representative of the FCC's consistent position.
As Judge Greene stated, "[tjhe Commission simply never liked the decree with its
restrictions to begin with, and it still does not." Id. n.89. Having argued in 1982 that the
line-of-business restrictions were "unnecessary and unwise," the FCC maintained that
position in 1987. Id. This consistent hostility to the line-of-business restrictions helps to
explain why the RBOCs fought so hard to have Congress designate the FCC as the sole
final arbiter (subject to judicial review) of whether the line-of-business restrictions as
carried forward into the Telecommunications Act of 1996 should be lifted. See infra notes
228, 237 and accompanying text.
136. See Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. at 543 & n.80.
137. Response of the United States to Comments on Its Report and Recommendations
Concerning the Line-of-Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies
by the Modification of Final Judgment, at 8 (Apr. 27,1987).
138. In contrast to the triennial review, where the Department of Justice set forth and
defended its views concerning the proper approach to the MFJ, the government took a
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The difficulty with the Department's proposals, however, was
that the proposals were not entitled to be evaluated simply (or even
primarily) as a public policy matter, as might occur in Congress. They
arose as proposals to modify a consent decree. This particular
consent decree, moreover, rested on a central premise that the
Department's proposals did not accept. The premise of the MFJ,
simply stated, was that the combination of monopoly and competitive
businesses in telecommunications presented unacceptable risks under
the antitrust laws-or, in the Department's own words, that
"regulatory mechanisms... are not sufficient to control the long term
incentives and abilities the BOCs would have to disadvantage
competitors in related markets.' ' 39 The MFJ thus embodied an
understanding that a structural antitrust resolution of the
Department's long-running disputes with the Bell System could do
what regulation could not: "achiev[e] conditions that would assure
full competition in the telecommunications industry."140 And it was
the MFJ that was before Judge Greene.
B. The District Court's Rulings
Judge Greene moved with dispatch to resolve the issues pending
in the triennial review.141 Following extended oral argument, he
issued a lengthy opinion in September of 1987 disposing of the
different tack on another controversy that came to a head at the same time. AT&T and
various non-parties had requested in 1985 that the Department enforce the MFJ's
prohibition on RBOC manufacturing of telecommunications equipment and customer
premises equipment, but the Department gave no response for more than two years.
When Judge Greene, who was informed in the triennial review briefing process of the
Department's apparent inaction in enforcing the MFJ, requested that the Department
explain itself, the Department took the position that only fabrication-and not design or
development of equipment-was subject to the manufacturing restriction. See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 675 F. Supp. 655, 656-62 (D.D.C. 1987). AT&T subsequently
moved for a declaratory ruling that the manufacturing restriction prohibited RBOC design
and development of telecommunications equipment, and the Department then generally
acknowledged that such activities fell within the definition of manufacturing as used in the
MFJ. See id. at 664-65. Judge Greene, who criticized the Department for its failure to
report to AT&T and others that it would not enforce the MFJ as requested (or why it
would not do so) or to request a judicial interpretation of the MFJ to the extent it was
uncertain of the decree's meaning, granted AT&T's motion. See id. at 658-68. In a
significant opinion, the D.C. Circuit affirmed. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894
F.2d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
139. Response of the United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification of
Final Judgment, at 57 (May 20, 1982).
140. Competitive Impact Statement, at 53 (filed by the Department of Justice on Feb.
10,1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170,7181 (Feb. 17, 1982).
141. Judge Greene was generally criticized by the RBOCs for taking what they
regarded as an excessive amount of time to rule on waiver requests. See infra notes 259-61
and accompanying text (discussing this criticism).
various motions of the Department of Justice and other parties. 142 In
this initial proceeding before the district court, the RBOCs and the
Department would get some but not most of the relief that had been
requested for the RBOCs.
Judge Greene began the opinion by recounting the history of the
government's litigation against the Bell System and the evidence that
the Department of Justice had introduced in United States v. AT&T.
This recitation emphasized the Department's evidence that the FCC
and other regulators had proved incapable of preventing the Bell
System from using its BOCs to facilitate cross-subsidization and
discrimination in order to undermine competition or discourage
potential competition in the long-distance and manufacturing
industries. The opinion discussed at length section VIII(C), the
MFJ's provision governing removal of the line-of-business
restrictions, which provided that an RBOC could receive relief
"'upon a showing... that there is no substantial possibility that it
could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it
seeks to enter."' 43 Judge Greene rejected what he termed the
"curious observation [of one of the RBOCs] that since the actual
parties to the decree have agreed to the elimination of the
information services restriction, the Court should implement that
agreement... without regard to the section VIII(C) requirements."u44
The main point in Judge Greene's discussion of section VIII(C),
however, was his rejection of RBOC claims-not made by the
Department of Justice-that "they do not retain their monopoly
power over the local bottlenecks."' 45  Toward the end of the
discussion, Judge Greene stated as follows:
The complete lack of merit of [the RBOCs'] arguments that
economic, technological, or legal changes have substantially eroded
or impaired the Regional Company bottleneck monopoly power is
demonstrated by the fact that only one-tenth of one percent of inter-
LATA traffic volume, generated by one customer out of one million,
is carried through non-Regional Company facilities to reach an
interexchange carrier. To put it another way, 99.9 percent of all
interexchange traffic, generated by 99.9999 percent of the nation's
telephone customers, is today carried entirely or in some part by
the Regional Companies (or their equivalents in the territories
served by the independents). The Department of Justice found only
twenty-four customers in the entire United States who managed to
142. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
143. Id at 532 (quoting MFJ § VIII(C)).
144. Id. at 534 & n.33.
145. Id. at 537.
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deliver their interexchange traffic directly to their interexchange
carriers, bypassing the Regional Companies.
146
Judge Greene concluded that "[i]t is clear, therefore, and the Court
finds, that no substantial competition exists at the present time in the
local exchange service, and that the Regional Companies have
retained control of the local bottlenecks."'147
This conclusion drove Judge Greene's disposition of the pending
motions. The court denied all the motions for alteration of the
interexchange restriction. These included several different proposals:
the request by several of the RBOCs that the restriction be lifted
altogether; the Justice Department's original proposal (withdrawn by
the Department but still asserted by some RBOCs) that would have
permitted the RBOCs to provide extraregional interexchange
services; the request that cellular and other wireless services be
exempted from the interexchange restriction; and the Department's
proposal that the restriction be retained but waivers granted "as soon
as state and local regulation is lifted with respect to a particular area
or locality." 14 Regarding the last proposal, Judge Greene stated,
"[t]he Court would be constantly reviewing requests for removal of
interexchange and information services restrictions on a state-by-
state, possibly county-by-county, basis, in order to determine whether
local regulation had changed sufficiently to allow such removals in the
particular area."' 49  This would be "detailed regulation of the
Regional Companies with a vengeance" and would be incompatible
with the court's goal of "phasing out or reducing its 'oversight'
responsibilities consistently with its responsibilities under the
decree."' 50 In short, the long-distance restriction stood unmodified.
The court also denied the requests to remove the MFJ's
manufacturing restriction.' 51 Judge Greene concluded that, in the
terms of section VIII(C), there was a "substantial possibility" that the
RBOCs would engage in anticompetitive activity if they were
permitted to enter the manufacturing market. He particularly noted
that "[t]he Department of Justice concedes that if the restriction were
lifted, each of the Regional Companies would satisfy all or nearly all
of its equipment needs from its own manufacturing affiliate." 52 But
Judge Greene also ranged beyond a strict antitrust analysis to discuss
146. Id. at 540 (citations and footnotes omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 544 (citing Response of the United States to Comments on Its Report and
Recommendations Concerning the Line-of-Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell
Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment, at 9, 28, 48 (Apr. 27, 1987)).
149. Id. at 545.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 552-62.
152. Id. at 556 (emphasis removed).
such matters as the effect of RBOC entry on innovation in the
manufacturing market, and he later engaged in a wide-ranging
discussion concerning the effect of any RBOC relief from the line-of-
business restrictions on various "public policies," among which he
numbered the protection of local telephone customers from high
rates, the goal of universal telephone service, and, with specific regard
to the manufacturing restriction, the United States' balance of
trade.153
Judge Greene also essentially retained the restriction on RBOC
provision of information services.154 This ruling, which the D.C.
Circuit would later require him to reconsider, flowed from Judge
Greene's conclusion that the RBOCs had not demonstrated any
"'significant technological or structural changes' that would
substantially reduce the dependence of information service providers
on the local exchange networks."'155
Finally, Judge Greene removed one line-of-business restriction:
the so-called catch-all restriction, which limited the RBOCs to
providing local exchange service and access service for connecting
providers.156  Judge Greene observed that, unlike the "core
restrictions" discussed above, the catch-all restriction had been
imposed without any evidence of Bell System misconduct, for the
1956 Final Judgment had similarly restricted the Bell System and this
restriction merely had been carried over into the MFJ. He further
noted that his expectation in 1982 that the "Regional Companies
would not have any substantial interest in entering unrelated
businesses, and that the line-of-business waiver requests to enter non-
telecommunications markets would therefore be rare," turned out to
be erroneous. 157  Rather, "dozens upon dozens of far-reaching
requests were filed almost immediately after divestiture," and the
court had granted every one of the 160 requests on which the Justice
Department had conducted a review and submitted a favorable
recommendation. 158 Judge Greene concluded that it was proper to
153. See id. at 583-87.
154. The restriction was lifted only insofar as was necessary "to enable the Regional
Companies to acquire and operate the infrastructure necessary for the transmission of
information services generated by others." Id. at 587; see also United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988) (subsequent opinion implementing ruling on
information transmission services by adding a section VIII(K) to the MFJ); United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 690 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying motions to amend the 714
F. Supp. 1 decision).
155. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. at 563 (quoting United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
592 F. Supp. 846,868 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
156. See id. at 597-99.
157. Id. at598.
158. Id.
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remove the catch-all restriction altogether, electing not even to retain
the four conditions upon which he had previously granted waivers of
the restriction.159
C. The Court of Appeals' Decision and Partial Remand
Before offering any assessment of Judge Greene's triennial
review ruling, it is appropriate to describe the D.C. Circuit's more
authoritative legal assessment. After all, most of Judge Greene's
critics have contended that he was a one-man regulatory agency who
seized upon powers outside of the judicial role-"Judge Greene
Versus the World" is how one editorialist of the day memorably
termed it.16° The court of appeals' decision, though providing
evidence on both sides of that contention, largely reveals the
criticism's inaccuracy.
The D.C. Circuit did not decide the triennial review appeal until
some two and one-half years after Judge Greene's initial ruling.161
When it did, it upheld the bulk of the judgment below-the retention
of the interexchange and manufacturing restrictions and the removal
of the catch-all restriction-and it vacated and remanded the
retention of the information-services restriction. The court of
appeals' decision is noteworthy not only for its judgment but also for
some of its comments.
First, the court of appeals addressed the section VIII(C) standard
for removal of the line-of-business restrictions. The court emphasized
a number of points: that section VIII(C) required a "'substantial
possibility,' [not] a mere theoretical possibility," that the RBOCs
would impede competition in the market they sought to enter; that
the RBOCs could not "impede competition" within the meaning of
159. See id. at 598-99; supra note 108 and accompanying text (summarizing these
conditions).
160. Bruce W. Radford, Judge Greene Versus the World, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 26,
1990, at 4. Judge Greene's critics felt so strongly that some strayed beyond the bounds of
good taste. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 10, at 12 (recounting that in November 1987
"an executive of a top U.S. publishing company, when asked what could be done to
convince Greene to free the regionals from the constraints of the AT&T agreement, told a
large audience, 'Well, they don't allow lynching"').
161. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This delay
must be attributed to the D.C. Circuit, not to Judge Greene. Judge Greene's final ruling
in the original triennial review proceeding was to deny various motions on June 22, 1988,
see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 690 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1988), which sought
changes in a ruling he had made in March 1988 implementing his September 1987 ruling,
see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988). Although the D.C.
Circuit ruled within four months of hearing oral argument in the triennial review appeal,
almost a year and a half had passed between Judge Greene's final ruling and that
argument. Compare Western Elea Co., 690 F. Supp. at 22, with Western Elec. Co., 900
F.2d at 283.
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section VIII(C) "unless the entering BOC will have the ability to
raise prices or restrict output" in that market; and that it was the
market that the RBOCs sought to enter, not the local exchange
market, that mattered.162 While these points-or at least the first and
third-may seem rather self-evident explications of the section
VIII(C) text, they certainly were clarifications or even corrections of
the standard. For example, under this interpretation, the district
court erred in focusing on cross-subsidization to the extent that the
court was concerned that the RBOCs would overcharge local
ratepayers (as opposed to being concerned that they would use
monopoly revenues to price below cost in competitive markets).
Second, the reviewing court rejected claims that Judge Greene
should have deferred to the Department of Justice's and FCC's views
in conducting the section VIII(C) analysis, but the court nevertheless
suggested that in the future the judge should pay closer attention to
the Department's views.163 The court of appeals acknowledged
having some sympathy for Judge Greene's attitude toward the Justice
Department's change of position on the line-of-business restrictions-
given that "[w]ith little warning or explanation, the DOJ completely
altered its stance [since divestiture] and is now generally hostile
toward the restrictions"-and it had no doubt that the government's
position would "undo much of the decree after only three years'
time."'164 The reviewing court wrote, however, that the district court
should take into account the Justice Department's "comparative
advantage" in "economic analysis and predictions of market
behavior" and, in particular, in evaluating the effectiveness of the
FCC's regulations in controlling RBOC conduct. 165
In the context of the triennial review, the foregoing discussion by
the court of appeals tracked the RBOCs' positions. But not all of the
court of appeals' exegesis of section VIII(C) was helpful for the
RBOCs. The court endorsed Judge Greene's fundamental position-
expressed early after divestiture when the waiver requests were
flooding in166 and reiterated in the triennial review proceeding167-
that the RBOCs ordinarily had to show a change in circumstances to
obtain relief from the MFJ's restrictions:
Under section VII(C) .... the BOCs must establish that
something is different now from the time when the decree was
entered so that they can no longer use their monopoly power to
impede competition. Obviously, if all conditions and assumptions
162. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 295-97.
163. See id. at 297.
164. Id. at 298.
165. Id. at 297-98.
166. See supra notes 99-106, 122 and accompanying texL
167. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
[Vol.50
August 1999] TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNDER JUDGE GREENE 1443
remain the same now as when the decree was entered, no relief can
be due under section VIII(C). 168
These changed circumstances need not be unforeseen changes, the
court emphasized, but the burden was on the RBOCs to prove the
change. 169
Finally, the court of appeals criticized the district court for
"stray[ing] beyond the competitive analysis mandated by section
VIII(C) when it considered the impact of removing the restrictions on
various public policies, including the welfare of local ratepayers,
innovation in the manufacturing market, the goal of universal
telephone service, first amendment values, and the United States'
position in international trade."'170 Although the D.C. Circuit took
Judge Greene at his "somewhat unusual" word that, notwithstanding
his discussion of these issues, they "'did not have an actual impact on
the Court's decisions,"' the court of appeals felt it important to
make clear that, however relevant to the "public interest" standard
under which Judge Greene had been required to evaluate the MFJ in
1982,172 these public policies were irrelevant to the section VIII(C)
analysis.
After this extended analysis of section VIII(C), the court of
appeals turned to reviewing the district court's judgments in the
triennial review. It affirmed the lower court's refusal to eliminate the
MFJ's interexchange and manufacturing restrictions. As to the
former, it was more sympathetic than Judge Greene to the argument
that FCC regulations promulgated since the MFJ had been entered
would reduce the RBOCs' ability to discriminate against competing
long-distance carriers and cross-subsidize long-distance service from
local operations. But it noted that those regulations operated on the
premise that the RBOCs would not be involved in the long-distance
market and, in particular, were not designed to account for any
RBOC "violations of the equal access policy [which] are extremely
difficult to detect and remedy."'1 73 And as to the latter, it noted that
neither the RBOCs nor the Department of Justice had segmented the
manufacturing market into different markets for telecommunications
equipment (where the argument that the RBOCs would foreclose
competition was strong) and customer premises equipment (where
the foreclosure argument was weaker), so the RBOCs could not be
168. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283,298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
169. See id. at 299.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 300 n.15 (quoting Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. at 580).
172. See supra note 91.
173. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 301 (citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846
F.2d 1422,1424-25 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
said to have met their burden under section VIII(C).174
The court of appeals' most interesting ruling was its vacatur and
remand of Judge Greene's retention of the information-services
restriction.17 5 To reach this result, the D.C. Circuit held that the
section VIII(C) test did not apply. The court of appeals noted that
AT&T and the United States-the other parties to the MFJ besides
the RBOCs-had not opposed removal of the information-services
restriction.176 The court concluded that, in those circumstances, the
motions to remove the information-services restriction were
uncontested by any party and should have been considered under
section VII of the MFJ, which provided no standard itself but was
governed by the common law of consent decree modifications. That
common law permits uncontested modification "even without a
showing of a 'change' of any kind so long as the resulting array of
rights and obligations is 'within the reaches of the public interest'
today."'177 "Because the 'public interest' test must take its meaning
from the nation's antitrust laws," the D.C. Circuit finally stated, "the
appropriate question under section VII is whether the proposed
modification would be certain to lessen competition in the relevant
market." 7 8
This ruling had two consequences. The immediate one was that
the court of appeals remanded the question of the continuing
propriety of the information-services restriction to the district court
for consideration under the new standard. The requirement that the
district court remove the restriction unless it could be "certain" that
doing so would lessen competition in the information-services market
set a dramatically lower bar than section VIII(C)'s antitrust standard.
On remand, Judge Greene removed the restriction in accordance with
the lower standard. 7 9
174. See id. at 301-05.
175. Although the D.C. Circuit styled this as a reversal, see id. at 289, 309, 311, its effect
was that of a vacatur. While distinctions between the two types of orders may blur
together in some instances, the salient point is that the district court was required to
reconsider its ruling under a different legal standard.
176. It was not clear that AT&T had agreed to the removal, but the D.C. Circuit
thought it dispositive that AT&T (and the Department of Justice) had not opposed such
action. See id. at 305 & n.27.
177. Id. at 306 (quoting United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.
1981)) (internal quotation omitted).
178. Id. at 308.
179. The information-services remand proceeding in the triennial review was a massive
undertaking itself. Not only did the RBOCs file new supporting papers and affidavits in
support of their removal request, but interested entities (such as newspapers and other
information-service providers) submitted what Judge Greene termed "voluminous
evidence in the form of affidavits and exhibits." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767
F. Supp. 308, 311 (D.D.C. 1991), affd, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993). (Having been
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It was clear that Judge Greene would have greatly preferred to
maintain the information-services restriction. He detailed at length
the antitrust-related reasons that the restriction should be retained
and summed up this discussion by stating that "were the Court free to
exercise its own judgment, it would conclude without hesitation that
removal of the information services restriction is incompatible with
the decree and the public interest." 8 0 His opinion lifting the
restriction sought to place the entire onus for the removal on the D.C.
Circuit. It appears further to have been written in such a way that the
D.C. Circuit on appeal from the remand would have been required to
reverse Judge Greene's second decision-and reinstate the
restriction-if it concluded that to retain the restriction a court did
not have to be absolutely "certain" that the RBOCs would impede
competition in the information-services market.181 The ruling thus
might be termed "Judge Greene's remand to the D.C. Circuit," but
the court of appeals was unmoved. It affirmed the removal of the
restriction.182
admonished by the D.C. Circuit in its triennial review opinion to consider carefully the
Department of Justice's predictive economic analysis, Judge Greene could not resist
noting that the Justice Department had submitted no additional affidavits or other
evidence. See id. at 313 (noting that "[lt may be regarded as odd that, on a remand for the
specific purpose of the compilation of an evidentiary record, the Department produced no
evidence whatsoever").) Notwithstanding the substantial amount of disputed evidence in
this proceeding, Judge Greene ruled reasonably expeditiously, resolving the matter 16
months after the D.C. Circuit's triennial review decision and only six months after briefing
was completed in the remand proceeding. Compare id. (decided July 25, 1991) with, e.g.,
Reply of the United States in Support of Motions for Removal of the Information Services
Restriction (Jan. 18,1991).
180. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 327.
181. That Judge Greene hoped for such a reversal is not too much to infer from the
comments in his opinion and from the unusual fact that, though granting the RBOCs'
request for a modification of the MFJ to permit them to offer information services, he
granted a stay, sun sponte, of this ruling. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767
F. Supp. 308, 332-33 (D.D.C. 1991); see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714
F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying motion to vacate stay); United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 714 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying motion for partial vacatur of stay). This stay
was soon vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33098 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1991). The Supreme Court then maintained its
consistent policy of refusing to get involved in disputes under the MFJ. See Am.
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 502 U.S. 932 (1991) (denying application to
reinstate stay).
182. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The D.C.
Circuit's opinion was written by Judge Stephen Williams, who consistently voted for the
RBOCs in MFJ appeals. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1243-48
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (Williams, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with ruling that held that AT&T's
opposition to RBOC waiver request triggered the section VIII(C) standard); United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 12 F.3d 225,237-44 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with ruling that the MFJ prohibited an arrangement whereby an RBOC
would fund a separate company involved in a prohibited line of business and take back a
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The other consequence of the court of appeals' triennial review
ruling that the public interest standard applied to uncontested
motions to modify the MFJ-i.e., motions not opposed by a party-
was to dangle in front of the RBOCs the tantalizing possibility that
section VIII(C)'s high standard would apply only if the Justice
Department opposed a modification request. In discussing section
VIII(C) in its triennial review opinion, the court of appeals had
dropped a footnote suggesting that a request by the Justice
Department to modify the MFJ might be evaluated under the low
public interest standard-regardless of the opposition of AT&T, the
other party to the MFJ.183 The court was equivocal on the matter, but
the hint was sufficient to ensure that the RBOCs would pursue the
point. By this time, AT&T had become the main opponent of RBOC
requests under section VIII(C) that involved the interexchange and
manufacturing markets, and mooting AT&T's opposition would be a
huge coup for the RBOCs with enormous practical implications. This
possibility would be played out after the triennial review, and there
should therefore be no misconception that the triennial review was
the last word even on section VIII(C).
IV. Beyond the Triennial Review
The triennial review, begun in 1987 and primarily resolved on
appeal in 1990, was the only full-scale assault by the RBOCs on the
MFJ for almost its entire duration, and the only one to be litigated to
a final ruling.184 Yet the RBOCs did not merely acquiesce in the
continuation of the manufacturing and interexchange line-of-business
restrictions. Rather, in the years following 1990, the RBOCs
royalty on any products or services created through such funding). The opinion in the
information-services appeal contained considerable favorable discussion of regulatory
means for cabining the RBOCs' incentives or ability to impede competition in information
services. See Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d at 1580-81. It is thus possible that, if the MFJ
had not been terminated after passage of the Telecommunications Act, these regulatory
concepts would have found application to any RBOC attempt at removal of the
manufacturing and long-distance restrictions. On the other hand, these analyses were all
set forth in the context of an uncontested motion to modify the MFJ (which the D.C.
Circuit had held in the triennial review appeal was subject only to the low "public interest"
standard), and it is therefore not clear that these concepts would have been deemed
relevant to a section VIII(C) analysis. But it is not too much speculation to say that the
concepts would have been largely rejected as inapposite by Judge Greene or that they
would have been deemed dispositive by Judge Williams if he had sat on any appeal, and
the matter would then have come down to views of the other D.C. Circuit judges who
heard such an appeal.
183. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283,294 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
184. In 1994, four of the RBOCs moved to vacate the MFJ. See infra text
accompanying notes 205-08. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 intervened before the
district court ruled on this motion. See infra text accompanying notes 230-39.
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mounted two types of efforts directed against these restrictions. First,
the RBOCs repeatedly sought entry into "limited" portions of the
interexchange business, although several of these attempts would
have provided legal precedents supporting elimination of even larger
chunks of the remaining restrictions. Second, the RBOCs
increasingly petitioned Congress for relief from the MFJ's
restrictions.
A. Litigation in the 1990's
Although its name suggests otherwise and the Department of
Justice had originally intended differently, the triennial review was-
if a lengthy process may be so-called-a one-time event. There was
no second triennial review. In 1989, the Department of Justice
informed Judge Greene that it intended to postpone the next filing of
a triennial review report until the appeals in the first triennial review
were concluded-for the D.C. Circuit's eventual ruling would
"'influence, if not control, the factual and legal issues that should be
considered by the Department"' in the next comprehensive review.185
In response, Judge Greene made clear that the Department had
"complete discretion" with regard to whether and when to conduct
such a review.186  He noted that "[t]he triennial review was the
Department's own idea, and it was not required as such by the
Court.' s7 But that was not all that Judge Greene had to say:
Beyond that, the need for such a review may not be as great now as
it appeared to be when the Department's suggestion was first made,
for two reasons. [ ] First, at the time, the Court and the
Department envisioned a comprehensive review every three years,
interspersed with an occasional waiver request. What has occurred
however, is a process of almost continuous review generated by an
incessant stream of regional company motions and requests dealing
with all aspects of the line of business restrictions.... No doubt, in
view of these motions and decisions, the need for an in-depth
examination every three years is far less than it would have been
had the parties and the Court left these matters essentially
unreviewed for that period of time.... [ ] Second, on the
significant issues implicated in the triennial review proceedings, the
Department has been simply and predictably supporting regional
company positions, advancing by and large the same arguments
they do, with the same underlying reasoning and assumptions. To
that extent, too, the intended value of the Department's triennial
review reports-as being those of a detached, unaligned observer
185. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11486, at *1 (D.D.C.
July 17,1989) (quoting Memorandum of the United States Concerning the Second Review
of the Line-of-Business Restrictions, at 2-3 (July 3, 1989)).
186. Id. at *5.
187. Id. at *1-*2 (citation omitted).
providing assistance to the Court of a kind that the directly
interested parties do not-has been diminished.188
Judge Greene's dissatisfaction with the way the waiver process had
evolved since the MFJ had been entered was clear.
Whether or not Judge Greene was correct in criticizing the
Justice Department for its alignment with the RBOCs, this statement
does reflect the essential characteristics of litigation under the MFJ
after the D.C. Circuit's 1990 triennial review decision. First, the
RBOCs continued to file a substantial number of requests for waivers
of the remaining line-of-business restrictions. To give just a few
examples, these included requests for waivers of the interexchange
restriction to deploy common channel signalling without regard to
LATA boundaries,189  to provide ordinary 800 and other
interexchange services that would be used to access one-way paging
systems and to transmit messages to and from associated voice
storage and retrieval systems,19° and to provide, through foreign
telecommunications entities, service between foreign countries and
the United States.19' Second, as Judge Greene observed, these waiver
requests were generally supported by the Department of Justice.
While neither the RBOCs nor the Department of Justice could essay
any broadbased assault on the long-distance and manufacturing
restrictions unless they could demonstrate that "something [was]
different... from the time when the decree was entered,"'1 2 the
Department was supportive of what RBOC opponents-using terms
that Judge Greene and the D.C. Circuit had earlier invoked-called
"piecemeal waivers" or "partial repeals" of the MFJ.193
188. Id. at *2-*4 (footnote omitted).
189. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 131 F.R.D. 647, 650-52 (D.D.C. 1990)
(denying blanket waiver request), reconsid denied, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12153 (D.D.C.
Sept. 6, 1990), affd, 969 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1992). A subsequent request, seeking not a
blanket waiver but a waiver for certain specified LATAs, was approved. See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., Civ. No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Nov. 10,1992).
190. See Motion of Pacific Telesis Group for a Waiver to Provide InterLATA Paging
Origination and Access to Voice Storage and Retrieval Services Provided in Connection
with Paging Services (Dec. 31,1992).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,604
(D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1991) (waivers to permit RBOCs to provide Australian "half" of
international telecommunications services between the United States and Australia);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,605 (D.D.C. Oct. 9,
1991) (similar waiver with regard to Venezuela). The RBOCs subsequently moved for
and were granted a "generic" international waiver. See United States v. Western Elec.
Co., Civ. No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Feb. 4,1993).
192. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see supra
text accompanying note 168.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 545 (D.D.C. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 309
n.29. The Justice Department, too, had long argued against partial repeals of the MFJ,
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In this regard, the D.C. Circuit's clarification of the section
VIII(C) standard in the triennial review provided guiding principles
for consideration of such waiver requests. Specifically, the RBOCs
had to demonstrate that each waiver request involved a separate
antitrust "submarket" of the interexchange or manufacturing
markets, for the RBOCs could not assert that they lacked the power
to impede competition in those general markets. There thus was a
settled legal standard under which to evaluate the RBOC requests.
Notably, there would have been no need for application of the
section VII(C) standard to many of these waiver requests if AT&T
had not adamantly opposed RBOC entry into long distance and
manufacturing. The question of the legal significance of AT&T's
position on a waiver request provided the most important challenge
to the line-of-business restrictions following the triennial review. The
RBOCs attempted to persuade the D.C. Circuit that only the
RBOCs' and the Department of Justice's positions should be
pertinent to the question of whether the demanding section VIII(C)
standard or, instead, the very lenient section VII "public interest"
standard applied to RBOC waiver requests. Specifically, the RBOCs
argued that a waiver request should be deemed "uncontested"--and
thus subject to the "public interest" standard-so long as the RBOCs
and the Department of Justice supported or did not oppose the
waiver. The Department joined in this argument.
In a significant opinion, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit
rejected the RBOCs' and the government's argument and held that
AT&T's opposition to a waiver request was enough to trigger the
section VIII(C) standard.194 The RBOCs had picked up on the
footnote in the triennial review opinion suggesting that the Justice
Department's support perhaps should cause a waiver request to be
considered under the low public interest standard,195 but the court of
appeals now rejected the implication of its earlier statement. Noting
that the parties had never previously proposed such a restrictive view
of AT&T's rights under the MFJ and in fact had taken positions
inconsistent with such a view, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
MFJ "gives AT&T the right, as a party to the decree, to assert its
warning that such waivers required drawing artificial "lines [that] have no basis in logic,
economics, or technology" and that will be "very difficult to maintain over time, and will
be subject to enormous erosive pressures." Response of the United States to Ameritech's
Motion for Clarification and Waiver of the Decree Regarding the Provision of Shared
Telecommunications and Other Services, at 30 (June 29,1984).
194. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This
case occasioned a rare division between Judge Laurence H. Silberman, who wrote the
majority opinion, and Judge Stephen F. Williams, who dissented. Cf. supra note 182
(discussing Judge Williams's attitude toward the MFJ).
195. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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objection to the BOCs' proposal and thus to invoke section
VIII(C).' 1 96 The 2-1 majority stated that "[i]t should be remembered
that section VIII(C) does not give AT&T the power to veto truly pro-
competitive line-of-business modifications, only to block those
changes that are quite possibly, though not certainly, anti-
competitive.' 97 But no one doubted that the RBOCs' last major
hope for judicial removal of the line-of-business restrictions was now
gone.198
The pattern of relatively small-scale RBOC waiver requests
(judged against the size of the waivers or, more accurately, the
modifications that had been sought in the triennial review)
predominated for some time. An example of such a waiver request
may be instructive. In 1992, the RBOCs moved for a waiver of the
MFJ to provide long-distance services in connection with the cellular
and other wireless services that the companies offered. In other
words, the RBOCs wanted the authority to provide to end-users not
only the local component of a cellular long-distance call, but also the
long-distance component. As with many things in tele-
communications, this request was small-scale only in relation to other
aspects of the telecommunications business. The long-distance
component of the wireless business itself amounted at least to
hundreds of millions of dollars, but was dwarfed by the billions of
dollars at stake in the larger long-distance industry.
The other parties to the MFJ divided along lines that by then had
become predictable. AT&T opposed the request, contending that the
RBOCs had failed to demonstrate that there was a discrete market
for interexchange wireless calls and that a waiver thus would permit
the RBOCs in fact to enter the general interexchange market. In
AT&T's judgment, the RBOCs had therefore failed to demonstrate
that there was no substantial possibility that they could impede
competition in the market they sought to enter, as section VIII(C)
required. AT&T also argued that the RBOCs had bottleneck control
over the facilities necessary to transport calls from cellular systems to
long-distance carriers (more specifically from so-called "mobile
telephone switching offices"-the heart of a cellular system-to the
long-distance companies' points-of-presence). The RBOCs could use
196. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d at 1240.
197. Id.
198. The significance of the RBOCs' and the Department of Justice's argument was
sufficiently clear that near the beginning of the oral argument in the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Silberman noted that "[the] argument is really a big enchilada, indeed," because it would
permit RBOC entry into the long-distance market without any showing that the RBOCs
were unlikely to impede competition in that market: "That's a big, big, big, big case."
United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 90-5333 et al. (D.C. Cir.), Transcript of
Proceedings, at 6-7 (Jan. 21,1992).
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this bottleneck control, AT&T suggested, to impede competition in
cellular services in the same ways they could impede any long-
distance service.
The Department of Justice, after a lengthy investigation,
supported the RBOCs' request for authority to provide long-distance
cellular services. As had now become typical of its approach, the
Department insisted that a series of conditions be attached to the
proposed waiver. The Department's conditions included the
following: an injunction against discrimination; a requirement that the
RBOCs employ a separate subsidiary to provide the long-distance
services; the development of an equal access plan; a requirement that
the RBOCs sell only long-distance service purchased from other
providers (and purchase no more than 45 percent from any one
source); and an obligation on the RBOCs to unbundle their local and
long-distance cellular services and market them separately. 199
Contrary to its rejection of Quagmires I and II in the early 1980's, the
Department of Justice generally responded to post-triennial-review
waiver motions by attempting to design a regulatory scheme to
support at least a major portion of the RBOC waiver request.
Although Judge Greene granted the RBOCs' motion, he
attached not only most of the conditions requested by the United
States but also an additional condition.2°° Specifically, he permitted
the RBOCs to provide long-distance cellular services only in areas
where the RBOCs' cellular competitor had an alternative to RBOC
transport for carriage of a call from the competitor's mobile
telephone switching office to the long-distance companies' points-of-
presence in the area.2= This was vintage Judge Greene. On the one
hand, he appeared to be giving the RBOCs some of the relief that
they sought. On the other hand, this additional condition was so
significant that it likely would have amounted to a denial of relief in
most instances.202
199. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated
as moot, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7285 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16,1996).
200. Judge Greene handed down his decision a little more than 10 months after the
RBOCs' motion had been presented to the court. Compare id. (decided April 28, 1995)
with Motion of the Bell Companies for a Modification of Section II of the Decree to
Permit Them to Provide Cellular and Other Wireless Services Across LATA Boundaries
(June 20, 1994). As set forth in the text, the motion had been pending in the Justice
Department for a substantial period of time beforehand.
201. See Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. at 5-6.
202. It is thus not surprising that the RBOCs appealed Judge Greene's order. The
appeal was dismissed and the order vacated when passage of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 rendered the dispute moot. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7285, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1996); see also infra note 231 and
accompanying text (noting Act's issuance to RBOCs of immediate authority to provide
cellular long-distance services).
This is not a criticism of Judge Greene. Judge Greene appeared
receptive to the Justice Department's suggestion that in certain
instances regulation could tamp down the RBOCs' ability to cross-
subsidize their competitive businesses out of local exchange revenues.
He remained concerned, however, with the central issue of the
RBOCs' bottleneck which, as he recalled in his opinion, was the
premise upon which the interexchange restriction of the MFJ had
been imposed. Although the particular bottleneck to which Judge
Greene pointed was, he acknowledged, somewhat different from the
bottleneck that had prompted the MFJ,203 his reasoning was entirely
consistent with the MFJ's premises. After all, the Department of
Justice had argued in 1982 that, even quite apart from the substantial
costs that it would impose on all involved, a regulatory alternative
could not "approach even remotely the effectiveness of the proposed
modification [of final judgment] in achieving conditions that would
assure full competition in the telecommunications industry.
''2°4
The RBOCs ultimately presented one last courtroom assault on
the entirety of the remaining line-of-business restrictions.2 5 On July
6, 1994, four RBOCs filed a motion to vacate the MFJ.2°6 They
argued that the premises on which the MFJ had been entered were no
longer valid. Specifically, they contended that a combination of
regulatory developments and technological changes in local exchange
markets since divestiture meant that the RBOCs no longer could
leverage into the competitive interexchange and manufacturing
markets. Judge Greene referred the motion to vacate to the
Department of Justice so that it might investigate and prepare a
recommendation.
203. See Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. at 3-5.
204. Competitive Impact Statement, at 53 (filed by the Department of Justice on Feb.
10, 1982) reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7181 (Feb. 17,1982).
205. In addition to the requests described above, there were, of course, numerous other
motions filed with Judge Greene after the triennial review (as well as before). These
included, for example, run-of-the-mill requests for slight changes in LATA boundaries.
Cf. Huber, supra note 8, at 99. The RBOCs and the Department of Justice also continued
from time to time to file requests for declaratory rulings that the MFJ did not prohibit
some activity. One of the more potentially far-reaching of these was the request for a
ruling that the MFJ did not bar an arrangement in which an RBOC would fund the
research-and-development activity of a separate corporation in exchange for a royalty on
any sales to third parties of products that the corporation developed on the basis of the
RBOC funding. The D.C. Circuit agreed with Judge Greene that this arrangement would
involve the RBOCs in prohibited lines of business via an "affiliated enterprise" in
violation of section 1(D) of the MFJ. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 12 F.3d 225
(D.C. Cir. 1993). The court concluded that the MFJ "cover[ed] all arrangements in which
the BOCs share directly in the revenues of entities engaged in prohibited businesses." Id.
at 227.
206. Motion of Bell Atlantic Corporation, BellSouth Corporation, NYNEX
Corporation, and Southwestern Bell Corporation to Vacate the Decree (July 6,1994).
[Vol.501452 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
August 1999] TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNDER JUDGE GREENE 1453
The motion to vacate was a substantial undertaking. The
RBOCs, consistent with the parties' post-triennial-review
sophistication on these matters, had retained numerous experts and
filed many affidavits in support of the motion. AT&T and various
non-parties would do the same in opposing the motion before the
Justice Department. The Department commenced an extensive
investigation of its own.2°7 But neither the Department, nor Judge
Greene, nor even the D.C. Circuit was the RBOCs' primary intended
audience. There was virtually no chance that Judge Greene would
grant the motion, and although the D.C. Circuit might present a more
favorable reception, the RBOCs had lost almost every assault in that
court on the interexchange and manufacturing restrictions.2 s The
motion was likely intended primarily to keep attention on the
RBOCs' arguments against the line-of-business restrictions while the
RBOCs focused their efforts on the one branch of the federal
government that had had little to do with the MFJ-or, for some
time, with telecommunications policy at all. The RBOCs turned to
Congress.
B. Legislation
Congress had long been unable to form a consensus concerning
what, if any, legislation it should adopt in the area of
telecommunications regulation. This state of affairs antedated even
the MFJ itself. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Congress
stalemated over whether legislatively to address the "AT&T
problem" which was then in litigation between AT&T and the
Department of Justice.2° When that problem was solved in 1982-
not by Congress, but by the MFJ-the new problem became whether
to enact legislation overruling the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions.
This "RBOC problem," as it might be termed, resulted in an even
longer congressional stalemate.210
207. Indeed, one of the four movants (Bell Atlantic) subsequently withdrew from the
motion, complaining that this was necessary "to avoid further punitive discovery by the
Department." Notice of Withdrawal, at 1 (May 2, 1995).
208. See infra notes 244-48 (citing cases).
209. See TEMIN, supra note 5, at 113-31, 175-90, 235-49; Alan Baughcum, Deregulation,
Divestiture, and Competition in U.S. Telecommunications: Lessons for Other Countries, in
MARKETPLACE FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 69,96 (Marcellus S. Snow ed., 1986).
210. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1381 ("[tlhe most that can be said of
Congress in this regard is that it resisted-or at least did not act upon-the Bell System's
pleas that it be given protection from the Department of Justice's antitrust suit that led to
divestiture (or the RBOCs' subsequent pleas that the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions
be lifted)"). Although the proposal did not focus on the line-of-business restrictions, it is
an interesting footnote that the ink was barely dry on the MFJ when influential members
of Congress began calling for legislation to change it. See, e.g., TEMIN, supra note 5, at
283-87; Caroline E. Mayer, AT&T Pact Changes Offered, Wirth Calls for Changes in U.S.
Congress's failure to act was not from want of RBOC lobbying
efforts or from an absence of sympathetic ears in Congress.21' As
early as 1986, the RBOCs had persuaded some of Congress's most
influential members that the FCC, and not the district court, should
have authority over the RBOCs' entry into long distance,
manufacturing, and other businesses. In particular, Bob Dole, then
the majority leader of the United States Senate, introduced legislation
in 1986 to accomplish precisely such a transfer of jurisdiction. This
would have been far more than a procedural victory for the RBOCs,
for the FCC opposed the line-of-business restrictions from the
beginning.212 Although the Reagan Administration supported the
Dole bill, the bill died in committee.213
These early efforts marked the beginning of a decade-long effort
to free the RBOCs from the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions.
Other proposals were made in the late 1980's and early 1990's that
would variously have removed jurisdiction from Judge Greene2 14 or
granted at least service-specific relief to the RBOCs. 15
Substantial efforts in Congress picked up steam once the D.C.
Pact with AT&T, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1982, at C7; Merrill Brown, Spotlight Glows on
Wirth As Leader in the Bell Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1982, at Fl. The entire story of
Congress's attempts for more than a decade to address the "RBOC problem" would
appear to call out for full-blown treatment by a political scientist. Some of the better
popular pieces that tell part of the story have appeared in unlikely places. See, e.g., David
J. Lynch, Lobbyists' Tug of War; Strategic Errors Offset Contributions, USA TODAY, Oct.
16, 1995, at 1B; Mike Mills, The New Kings of Capitol Hill; Regional Bells Use Lobbying
Clout to Push for New Markets, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1995, at H1; Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Fight for the Future; Part I: Getting the Ball to Congress, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, April
1992, at 50; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Fight for the Future; Part II: Invading the Capitol, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER, May 1992, at 56.
211. To be sure, other entities lobbied, too, as the discussion below makes clear. See
infra text accompanying notes 227-29. The initial focus must be on the RBOCs because it
was they who sought a change in the status quo.
212. See supra note 135.
213. The next Congress also failed to act on a proposal that would have allowed the
RBOCs to enter the information services and telecommunications equipment
manufacturing businesses, subject to FCC regulations. See H.R. 2140, 101st Cong., 135
Cong. Rec. H1434 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1989) (introduction of so-called "Swift-Tauke" bill,
some version of which was regularly introduced in the late 1980's); see also Richard A.
Hindman, Comment, The Diversity Principle and the MFJ Information Services
Restriction: Applying Time-Worn First Amendment Assumptions to New Technologies, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 504 n.236 (1989) (describing MFJ-related legislative efforts in late
1980's).
214. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Baby Bell Cleared to Invest Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1989, at Al.
215. See, e.g., Telecommunications Equipment Research and Manufacturing
Competition Act, S. 1981, 101st Cong. (introduced Nov. 21, 1989); Sullivan & Hertz, supra
note 6, at 234 n.2 (describing 1989 and 1990 legislative efforts directed against MFJ's
manufacturing and information-services restrictions).
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Circuit's decisions in the 1990 triennial review appeal216 and the 1992
common channel signaling appeal 217 dashed any hope for prompt
judicial action in the RBOCs' favor. Legislation that would have
granted the RBOCs freedom to manufacture telecommunications
equipment passed the Senate by a large margin in 1991.218 A more
comprehensive effort was underway in the House. After they
resolved their own jurisdictional dispute which had bogged down
efforts in 1992, the powerful Chairmen of the House Judiciary
Committee and its Commerce Committee (Jack Brooks and John
Dingell, respectively) made common cause on behalf of legislation
that essentially would have lifted the manufacturing restriction and
given the Department of Justice and the FCC the authority to permit
RBOC entry into long distance.219 Although this coalition enabled
legislation overwhelmingly to pass the House in the summer of
1994,220 the effort died in the Senate when the RBOCs concluded that
it overly favored the existing long-distance companies and did not go
far enough in removing the MFJ's restrictions.221
The RBOCs had many weapons available for an extended
legislative fight. The RBOCs were, after all, seven of America's
largest corporations-a status that in itself commands influence in
Washington, D.C. Moreover, their regional organization meant that
they would have special claim on particular members of Congress. 222
The RBOCs, having taken well more than half a million Bell System
workers with them upon divestiture, were among the handful of
216. See supra text accompanying notes 161-83.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
218. See Telecommunications Equipment Research and Manufacturing Competition
Act, S. 173, 102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC. S7106 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (passed by 71-24
vote).
219. See Antitrust and Communications Reform Act, H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 139
CONG. REC. H10911 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1993). H.R. 5096 was the earlier major effort in
1992. See Antitrust Reform Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 138 CONG. REC. H3038 (daily ed.
May 7, 1992). Unhappy with Brooks's efforts to move this bill directly from the
Committee on Judiciary to the House floor, Dingell had requested "an extended
sequential referral" of the bill to his Committee on Energy and Commerce. See Letter
from John D. Dingell, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce, to the Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House, May 27, 1992, at 1 (on
file with author).
220. See Antitrust and Communications Reform Act, H.R. 3626, 103d Cong. (1994)
(roll call no. 292); 140 Cong. Rec. H5246-02 (1994) (423-5 vote); Edmund L. Andrews,
House Set to Pass Changes in Telecommunications Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at
D1.
221. See Jon Healey, Stumped by Bells' Objections, Hollings Kills Overhaul, 52 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 2669 (Sept. 24,1994).
222 Cf. Mills, supra note 210, at HI (suggesting that "[p]erhaps the biggest source of
the Bells' power... is simple geography").
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largest employers in every one of their seven regions.2 3 The
companies further demonstrated that they understood that delving
into the political process required a willingness to dig into their
pockets.224
By 1994, the RBOCs' eight years of legislative efforts had taken
root. Each session of Congress was virtually assured of at least one
serious effort to enact legislation superseding the MFJ. At the same
time, larger political forces became more hospitable to such
legislation. First, the Republican capture of both houses of Congress
in the 1994 elections ensured that the RBOCs' natural allies-
deregulation-minded politicians-would be setting the congressional
agenda. Second, the Democratic Clinton Administration had come to
view RBOC entry into the prohibited lines of business not so much as
an antitrust problem as a potential source of job growth.22s
In these circumstances, the long-distance companies and other
political opponents of the RBOCs, which had been vigorously
resisting the RBOCs' efforts for almost a decade, realized that a
change in tactics was necessary. The debate accordingly shifted in the
mid-1990's, in practical terms, from the question whether the RBOCs
would get legislative MFJ relief to the question what that legislation
would consist of. The waters of the legislative debate ebbed and
flowed, sometimes (given their multiple currents) at the same time.
The RBOCs sought legislation granting them unconditional entry into
the long-distance and manufacturing markets. 226 By contrast, the
long-distance companies supported efforts that focused on increasing
competition in local telephony.227 Although they were primarily in a
defensive posture, the long-distance companies essentially argued
223. See Vietor, supra note 19, at 82 (Table 2-6 listing assets, revenues, and number of
employees of each RBOC after divestiture).
224. See Mills, supra note 210, at H1 (noting that, according to the FCC, the RBOCs
spent $41 million on state and federal lobbying in 1992 and $64 million in 1993, recounting
that "[RBOC] lobbyists themselves say their annual budget for influencing Congress has
been $20 million a year in recent years," and explaining why "those figures may only
scratch the surface").
225. See, e.g., Jube Shiver Jr., Telecommunications Bill Faces Extinction in Senate, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at D1 (noting Clinton Administration estimates that pending
telecommunications bill "would boost America's global competitiveness and produce 1.4
million jobs by 2003"); Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, White House to Seek New Cable, Phone
Laws, DALLAS MORNING-NEWS, Dec. 22, 1993, at 1A ("The administration hopes that
breaking down restrictions on what companies can compete in the different arenas of
communications will spur growth and create jobs in industries that now account for 12
percent of the nation's $6.3 trillion economy.").
226. See Mills, supra note 210, at H1.
227. See, e.g., Martin Rosenberg, Sprint Deal Is a "Very Big Undertaking," K.C. STAR,
Oct. 26,1994, at B1; Sandra Sugawara, MCI Unveils Plan to Bypass the Baby Bells, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 1994, at Fl; Lynne Marek, Bells Try to Hang Up Phone Legislation; Bill
Would Add Regional Competition, Cm1. TRM., Sept. 9, 1993, Business Section, at 1.
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that the RBOCs should not be permitted into the markets restricted
by the MFJ unless and until the RBOCs' monopoly control over local
telecommunications was eroded.
By 1995, it was clear that Congress was likely to pass a
telecommunications bill before the 1996 election. The House of
Representatives passed a bill on August 4, 1995, without AT&T's
support. The long-distance companies, which had supported that bill
before it was amended in ways favorable to the RBOCs, got back
on board late in the year when conference negotiations between key
House and Senate figures resulted in several changes that these
companies favored. In particular, the legislation formalized the role
that the Department of Justice would play in any removal of the line-
of-business restrictions.22 9  This change and other compromises
removed the last substantial opposition to congressional action.
On February 1, 1996, just three days short of the 109th
anniversary of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 by overwhelming marginsP 0 The
bill contained numerous provisions that granted the RBOCs
immediate partial relief from the MFJ's remaining restrictions,
modelling the substance of several of the RBOCs' piecemeal waiver
requests. For example, Congress specified that the RBOCs could
provide long-distance telecommunications service in connection with
their cellular and other wireless services and on any "extraregional"
calls (i.e., calls originating outside of the region where the RBOCs
controlled landline monopolies),231 Congress also permitted the
RBOCs to enter into arrangements with manufacturers under which
the RBOCs could fund manufacturing research and then earn a
royalty on sales to third parties of any products developed with that
228. In particular, the long-distance companies were dissatisfied that the proposed law
did not give the Department of Justice a say in determining whether the RBOCs had
opened their local exchanges to competition sufficiently to justify their entry into long
distance and manufacturing. See Ralph Vartabedian, Landmark Reform of
Communications Law OKd in House, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5,1995, at Al.
229. See infra note 237 (describing requirement that FCC consult with Department of
Justice). The long-distance companies would have preferred an even more substantial
role for the Department of Justice, such as its having dual jurisdiction with the FCC over
RBOC entry into long distance and manufacturing.
230. See Edmund L. Andrews, Congress Votes to Reshape Communications Industry,
Ending a 4-Year Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al (reporting on vote and
proceedings). The historic Interstate Commerce Act-which had formed the basis for the
Communications Act of 1934 to which the new Telecommunications Act was an
amendment, but which had been whittled down during the two decades leading up to the
Telecommunications Act-had been repealed by Congress only weeks before. See
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1336 & n.51.
231. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(b)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1999).
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funding.232
The Telecommunications Act nonetheless was far from a
complete victory for the RBOCs. The core long-distance restriction,
though no longer within Judge Greene's power to enforce, was not
abolished. Congress simply codified it in section 271P3 Moreover,
Congress changed the standard for removal of the restriction, but it is
not clear that the new standard is more favorable to the RBOCs than
the section VIII(C) standard that it replaced. Specifically, Congress
required that in order to enter into the long-distance business, an
RBOC must (a) demonstrate that it has complied with a 14-point
competitive checklist, which essentially requires the RBOCs to open
up their local exchanges to competition and to unbundle enough
network elements that competitors can develop alternatives to the
RBOCs' local exchanges; (b) comply with a separate-subsidiary
requirement; and (c) persuade the FCC that the RBOC's entry into
long distance is "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity." 34  While it is doubtful that these second and third
requirements will provide much independent basis for denying
RBOC entry into long distance,235 the competitive checklist for local
telephony is a substantial requirement and one that no RBOC has
been found to satisfy in the more than three years since the passage of
the Act.236
One of the Telecommunications Act's primary purposes is
reduction of the RBOC bottleneck monopoly to its technologically
irreducible minimum. Section 271's competitive checklist
incorporates by reference various provisions in sections 251 and 252
of the Act, which are attempts by regulatory means (e.g.,
232. See id. § 273(b)(2); cf. supra note 205 (discussing MFJ proceeding concluding that
such an arrangement was prohibited).
233. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(a), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
234. See id. § 271(b)(1), (d)(3).
235. But cf. Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Communications Act of 1934, As Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
Michigan, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20741-51 (1997) (FCC decision discussing content of "public
interest" standard of 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(3)(C)).
236. See, e.g., id.; Application of BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region,
InterLATA Services in Louisiana, 13 FCC Rcd 539 (1997); Application of BellSouth
Corporation, et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, 13 FCC Rcd 539
(1998); Application by SBC Communications Inc., Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
Oklahoma, 12 FCC Rcd 8685 (1997). Congress also codified the bulk of the MFJ's
manufacturing ban, which was the other remaining line-of-business restriction, and made
removal of this ban turn on whether the RBOC in question had received long-distance
relief. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 273(a) (West Supp. 1999).
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interconnection, unbundling, and resale mandates) directed to the
RBOCs (and other local exchange carriers) to foster the development
of local competition.237 Thus, the opening up of the RBOCs' local
exchange monopolies to competition to the extent possible-a
prospect that the MFJ perhaps contemplated in section VIII(C) but
never made a goal-has become a goal of telecommunications law.
The Telecommunications Act spelled the end of the MFJ.
Specifically, it eliminated the MFJ's prospective effect by providing
that "[a]ny conduct or activity [heretofore] subject to any restriction
or obligation imposed by the [MFJ] shall [hereafter] be subject to the
restrictions and obligations imposed by [this Act] and shall not be
subject to the restrictions and the obligations imposed by the
[MFJ]." 2 3s Accordingly, on April 11, 1996, Judge Greene terminated
the MFJ, nunc pro tunc, as of February 8, 1996, the date the
Telecommunications Act had been signed into lawP39 All of the
parties to the case and all other interested entities that filed
comments on the issue had agreed that this was the appropriate
course of action. Jurisdiction over RBOC entry into the long-
distance and manufacturing industries now rested with the FCC, not
with Judge Greene. An era was over, not merely in
telecommunications regulation, but in American law.
V. An Assessment
Now that Judge Greene no longer presides over the MFJ, it is
appropriate to judge him. What are we to make of this chapter in our
legal history? Although the foregoing chronology should provide the
initial basis for others to come to their own conclusions, regardless of
whether they lived through a portion of this history, one set of
answers follows.
As an initial matter, there is some argument-though ultimately
not a persuasive one-that Congress has already answered the
question just posed. On the one hand, the statements of some
members of Congress influential in the passage of the
Telecommunications Act, made both contemporaneously with the
passage of the Act and for many years previous, conveyed a deep
237. The Telecommunications Act's adoption of a regulatory model can also be seen in
less direct ways as well, particularly in the explicit provision in section 271 that, while the
FCC must consult with and give "substantial weight" to the Department of Justice's view
in determining whether to permit the RBOCs into long distance, the Department's view
does not bind the FCC. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
238. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 601(a)(1), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56,
143,47 U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West Supp. 1999).
239. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 171,364 (D.D.C.
Apr. 11, 1996).
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unhappiness with Judge Greene's actions and a sense that he had
become a one-man regulatory commission.24  Of course, these
politicians' statements do not themselves amount to a congressional
judgment.
Once the rhetoric is left aside, the Telecommunications Act itself
could permit a number of different inferences concerning Congress's
view of Judge Greene's job performance. Consider first that
Congress ratified a number of the MFJ's restrictions as they had been
240. See Taylor, supra note 210, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, April 1992, at 53
(describing in detail one legislative battle over the MFJ and noting that Judge Greene's
"domineering role as telecommunications czar has infuriated many in Congress, the FCC,
and the administration"). As set forth above, this view of Judge Greene's tenure has also
been espoused by numerous non-politicians, including various academics. See, e.g., PAUL
W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH
COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 37-42 (1996); supra note 9
(citing sources, including some by academics). It bears mention that, on this question (and
increasingly on other issues in regulated industries law), it can be difficult to separate out
those writers who are disinterested and those who are not-Le., those who have some
economic or other non-academic stake in the questions they are addressing and those who
do not. For example, consider the multiple articles in the July-August 1995 issue of
Managerial and Decision Economics: The International Journal of Research and Progress
in Management Economics. That iteration of the scholarly journal is billed as a "Special
Issue" addressed to "The AT&T Antitrust Settlement: Costs and Benefits."
Notwithstanding its academic nature and its seeming promise of evenhandedness, one is
rather hard pressed to find throughout its eleven articles-whose authors include faculty
members at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Chicago, and
Stanford University-any discussion of the MFJ's benefits. This is unsurprising if one
realizes that these articles are simply repackaged versions of affidavits that the RBOCs
filed in support of a 1994 motion to vacate the MFJ and for which these authors (or,
equally accurately and more revealingly, these afflants) were undoubtedly compensated.
But the articles generally do not even refer to this fact, see, ag., David E.M. Sappington,
Revisiting the Line-of-Business Restrictions, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 291
(1995); Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in Long-Distance and Telecommunications
Markets: Effects of the MFJ, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 365 (1995); but see
Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Competitive Effects of Line-of-Business Restrictions in
Telecommunications, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 301, 320 (1995)
(acknowledging that "[tjhis paper is based on an affidavit submitted by [two of the
authors] on behalf of the Regional Bell Operating Companies in February 1994"), and one
unsuspecting of this fact would learn it only by reading an introductory article (which is
not billed as a foreword), see Richard S. Higgins, The Costs and Benefits of the AT&T
Antitrust Settlement: An Overview, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 275, 275-76
(1995). It is not clear why some of the affidavits submitted in opposition to the RBOCs'
motion to vacate could not also have been included in the issue (as opposed to merely one
such affidavit's being summarized in two paragraphs, see id. at 280-81). Perhaps the
answer may be found in the fact that the editor of the issue and the editor-in-chief of the
journal were themselves RBOC affiants. It would seem that, at least for the academics
writing in the area, disclosure of interests would be appropriate, and some writers follow
this practice. See, e.g., Baumol & Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 3, at 1037
n.**; Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 3, at 1081 n.**; Sullivan,
supra note 6, at 495 n.19, 522 n.97.
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retained and interpreted by Judge Greene, even where the RBOCs or
the Department of Justice had maintained that Judge Greene's
actions were unlawful. The most noteworthy example is the retention
of the core restriction on RBOC provision of in-region long-distance
service. This can be taken as a congressional judgment that Judge
Greene had acted correctly in rebuffing the RBOCs' efforts in the
triennial review to remove the long-distance restriction altogether. A
similar argument could be made based on Congress's not having
adopted in the Telecommunications Act the Department's position in
the triennial review that such RBOC relief would be justified by the
mere removal of entry restrictions into local telephony. Yet all such
congressional retentions or incorporations of Judge Greene's actions
could be taken instead to imply at least something of a negative
judgment concerning Judge Greene. For if Congress approved, why
would it take away jurisdiction?
The various congressional alterations (as opposed to
preservations) of the landscape as it had existed under the MFJ can
also support inconsistent inferences. For example, Judge Greene's
opinions reflect an almost exclusively structural approach to
controlling the RBOCs' incentive to use their local monopolies to
engage in anticompetitive conduct. Although he granted several
waivers or modifications of the MFJ premised on certain regulatory
requirements (e.g., separate subsidiaries), even in these contexts (and
certainly in others) Judge Greene generally decided motions based on
a view that the very existence of the RBOCs' local monopolies
required their exclusion from the long-distance and manufacturing
markets. The cellular long-distance order entered shortly before the
MFJ's demise is an example of this view, for Judge Greene's
modification of the MFJ was accompanied not only by regulatory
requirements of separate subsidiaries and other conditions but also by
the structural requirement that there be no RBOC bottleneck for
transporting a cellular competitor's calls from the competitor's
network to the long-distance companies' points-of-presence. 241
Congress's diminished emphasis on a structural approach to
telecommunications law and its specific grant of relief to the RBOCs
to provide cellular long-distance service could be seen in different
ways. While these actions could be taken as reflecting disapproval of
Judge Greene's approach, they could equally reflect Congress's
opinion that these actions were good ideas but were not possibilities
open to Judge Greene in interpreting a consent decree that
incorporated the Department of Justice's litigation theories from
some time ago.
241. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
Most fundamentally, the Telecommunications Act can be said to
reflect a mixed view, or even no view, of Judge Greene's
administration of the MFJ. For example, the legislation may simply
reflect Congress's collective judgment that, whatever the advisability
of the MFJ at the time that it was entered and even subsequently,
circumstances at the time of the Act's passage made the MFJ qua
MFJ no longer advisable. These circumstances might particularly
include Congress's sense that it was time to promote the introduction
of competition into local telephony-a point on which the MFJ had
no position. Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis, this theory
would go, and the law designed for today and tomorrow, though
different, would not be intended to reflect any judgment concerning
that applied yesterday. This possibility, along with the fact that
Congress's view concerning the wisdom of a particular policy is
entitled in an academic context to persuasive force only, means that
we must look elsewhere in assessing Judge Greene.
If we cannot conclusively applaud or condemn Judge Greene's
administration of the MFJ by considering Congress's action to replace
the decree, we can look to the opinions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit is the only court that
reviewed any of Judge Greene's actions in any detail and the only one
to have expressed its opinion in at least some contexts.242
The D.C. Circuit's opinions reflect a substantially positive
reaction to Judge Greene's administration of the MFJ. The court of
appeals published twelve separate opinions reviewing challenges to
Judge Greene's decisions interpreting, modifying, or refusing to
modify the MFJ. 243  In nine of these opinions, it found no error.
242. The only action taken by the Supreme Court on the merits of any MFJ dispute was
to summarily affirm the MFJ and the plan of reorganization. See Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). The Court
denied certiorari in various subsequent cases that the RBOCs or certain intervenors tried
to bring up from the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., U S West, Inc. v. United States, 480 U.S. 922
(1987) (declining without comment to review 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (same for 846 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1988));
MCI Communications Corp. v. United States, 498 U.S. 911 (1990) (same for 900 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir. 1990)); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. United States, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (same for 907
F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); Ameritech Corp. v. AT&T, 507 U.S. 951 (1993) (same for 969
F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Consumer Fed'n Am. v. United States, 510 U.S. 984 (1993)
(same for 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
243. The number of appeals, of course, was larger than this for two reasons. First, many
cases involved multiple appellants, as in the triennial review, for example, where all the
RBOCs and numerous intervenors filed appeals. See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
900 F.2d 283, 286-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (listing counsel for, among others, party appellants
and non-party intervenor appellants). Second, the D.C. Circuit in some cases acted
without published disposition, in circumstances ranging from dismissals of appeals for
procedural reasons, see, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., Nos. 88-5185, 88-5186
(D.C. Cir. July 1, 1988) (dismissal of appeals that were premature under former version of
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These included numerous outfight affirmances reflecting agreement
on such important determinations as that the MFJ prohibited the
RBOCs from offering access services to end users at rates below
those charged interexchange carriers, 244 that the manufacturing
restriction banned RBOC design and development of equipment and
not just its fabrication,2 45 and that AT&T's opposition to a waiver
triggered the section VIII(C) standard.246 In two of the other three
opinions, the D.C. Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. One
of these was the opinion in which the D.C. Circuit reversed Judge
Greene's holding that the MFJ required waivers for RBOC entry into
local telephony outside the RBOCs' home regions; at the same time,
the court affirmed Judge Greene's ruling that the MFJ bound the
holding companies such as Ameritech and Bell Atlantic as well as
their BOC subsidiaries.247 The other partial reversal was in the court
of appeals' opinion requiring Judge Greene in the triennial review to
reassess whether to retain the information-services restriction under a
standard that was not set forth on the face of the MFJ; the court there
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)), to a remand, see United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18418 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1990) (remanding to permit
district court to reconsider waiver decision in light of D.C. Circuit's intervening triennial
review decision), to an affirmance, see United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 89-5127
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1990) (affirming denial of private individual's motion to intervene and
for related relief concerning termination of his answering service telephone number).
244. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
245. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
246. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The D.C.
Circuit also affirmed Judge Greene's decisions that the MFJ prohibited the manner in
which Bell Atlantic proposed to structure a "gateway" service introducing consumers to
information-service providers, see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 907 F.2d 160 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), that the information-services restriction had to be removed in the triennial
review remand, see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572 (1993); supra text
accompanying notes 179-82, and that AT&T was entitled to a waiver of section I(D) of the
MFJ insofar as the provision would have prohibited AT&T's acquisition of McCaw
Cellular Communications, Inc., see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); supra note 51. The court of appeals dismissed a challenge to Judge Greene's
referral of certain waiver requests to the Department of Justice under procedures that he
had instituted. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The
D.C. Circuit also remanded without finding error in two instances. In one case, the
remand was because there was confusion in the court of appeals over whether the waiver
request had been contested or uncontested (and hence over whether section VII's "public
interest" test or, rather, section VII(C)'s test applied). See United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 907 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1990); cf. supra notes 175-78, 183, 194-98 and accompanying
text. In the other, the court affirmed Judge Greene's denial of a declaratory ruling
concerning a "funding/royalty" arrangement that the RBOCs and the United States
proposed, but remanded for "further exploration of the [fallback] waiver request." United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 12 F.3d 225,237 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
247. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see supra
text accompanying notes 112-27.
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affirmed the district court's rejection of the RBOCs' and the
Department of Justice's requests to modify or remove the long-
distance and manufacturing restrictions.248 The D.C. Circuit outright
reversed Judge Greene in only one published opinion under the
MFJ.249
Any assessment based on the bottom lines of affirmances and
reversals, it must be acknowledged, is somewhat crude.2-0
Nonetheless, these rulings are the intended results of appellate
review, and here they reflect favorably on Judge Greene. Most
fundamentally, the D.C. Circuit never reversed Judge Greene on any
bottom-line ruling concerning the manufacturing and long-distance
restrictions. In short, the overall impression one gets from the court
of appeals concerning the administration of the MFJ is favorable.
This favorable impression of Judge Greene remains when one
looks beyond the assessments of Congress and the D.C. Circuit.
Perhaps it should be said, at the outset and with the benefit of
hindsight, that Judge Greene was not aware that he was in the midst
of an extraordinary transformation of the nation's conception of the
proper role of a public utility company.25' Beginning approximately
the time that the government filed its lawsuit in 1974, a variety of
federally regulated industries-including most dramatically airlines,
railroads, and trucks, but also long-distance telecommunications-
shifted from a model where monopoly or oligopoly service was
thought the appropriate means for advancing the public interest, to a
248. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see supra
text accompanying notes 141-78.
249. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing
district court order that had required the RBOCs to obtain Department of Justice
approval before acquiring a conditional interest in any entity engaged in activities
prohibited by the MFJ). The court of appeals also reversed Judge Greene's conviction of
one of the RBOCs for criminal contempt. See United States v. NYNEX Corp., 8 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1993). The government had prosecuted NYNEX for violating the MFJ by
allegedly providing information services through a subsidiary, Telco Research Group, to
MCI. Although NYNEX's assignment of errors included what the D.C. Circuit termed "a
significant objection" to Judge Greene's denial of NYNEX's request for a jury trial, the
court of appeals did not reach that issue. Id. at 53. It rather reversed because it concluded
that NYNEX's computer-based offering was not clearly an information service (which the
MFJ then prohibited the RBOCs from offering), as opposed to customer premises
equipment (which the MFJ permitted them to provide). See id. at 54-57.
250. For example, although the D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Greene's decision in the
triennial review to retain the MFJ's manufacturing and long-distance restrictions, it also
criticized some aspects of his conception of the section VIII(C) standard for evaluating the
continuing propriety of those restrictions. See Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 295-300;
supra text accompanying notes 162-72.
251. To be sure, this lack of awareness distinguishes Judge Greene not at all from
virtually all others involved in regulated industries law during this time period. Cf.
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 13, at 1407 & n.383.
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reliance on competition 252 This is not to suggest that the MFJ's line-
of-business restrictions were part of the old regime. To the contrary,
they were an essential step in ensuring the paradigm shift in
telecommunications.25 3 But to the extent that Judge Greene thought
it desirable to keep the RBOCs not only out of markets such as
interexchange, manufacturing, and information services (which were
closely related to the local exchange services in which the RBOCs
possessed a monopoly), but also out of fairly unrelated businesses, he
was swimming against what we now know was a historic current that
was washing away the distinction between public utility companies
and common carriers, on the one hand, and "unregulated" industries,
on the other.
It must also be said, however, that this mindset (as opposed to
the actual requirements of the MFJ) does not appear to have
disadvantaged the RBOCs much in practice. For example, as noted
previously, Judge Greene approved each of the 160 requests for
waivers of the catch-all restriction that had gone through the
procedure that he devised and had received the Justice Department's
support. 254 Further, the question in the decision that earlier afforded
the basis for characterizing Judge Greene's conception of the RBOCs
as one of traditional public utilities and not diversified enterprises was
whether the MFJ barred extraregional exchange activities, not
whether the MFJ should be waived if it did (and recall that the D.C.
Circuit reversed Judge Greene on this interpretive point).25 5 Indeed,
Judge Greene indicated that under some circumstances he would be
receptive to a waiver request in this instance as well. 256
The inquiry thus must rather focus on Judge Greene's actions in
administering the MFJ, and here Judge Greene earns high marks. As
an initial matter, considerable credit must be given to the individuals
who drafted and proposed the MFJ. It should not be forgotten that
the parties had eschewed various proposals for decrees that would
have required detailed superintendence by the district court over an
extraordinary array of RBOC activities.257 By rejecting various
regulatory decrees (such as Quagmire I and Quagmire II) in favor of
a structural decree, the parties enabled the district court to limit its
continuing jurisdiction largely to matters at the margin of the
RBOCs' operations that were permitted under the MFJ or to RBOC
252. See generally id. at 1329-64 (detailing this great transformation).
253. See id. at 1351-52.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 105-11 and 158.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
256. See Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1109.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
efforts simply to go beyond those operations.2 8
While the RBOCs and those sympathetic to them have
contended that Judge Greene was all too involved in the RBOCs'
business affairs, his involvement was neither inherent in the MFJ's
scheme nor (with perhaps very limited exceptions) a result of
independent initiative by Judge Greene. His activities-the various
orders that he issued or requirements that he imposed-came about
because of the actions of the parties to the MFJ. It was thus the
Justice Department's triennial review, for example, or AT&T's
request for a declaratory ruling concerning the scope of the
manufacturing restriction, or, most frequently by far, the RBOCs'
own numerous motions for waivers or modifications of the MFJ's
line-of-business restrictions that usually prompted Judge Greene's
rulings.
As for the RBOCs' claims that the costs of the waiver process
were too great in the aggregate to justify the process, this would not
alone justify eliminating the line-of-business restrictions. The logical
alternative instead would have been a decree that permitted no
contested waivers unless the background standard for modifying
consent decrees-the demanding "changed circumstances" test-was
258. Although the point is almost never made in discussions of RBOC exclusion from
long-distance service and other businesses, it bears mention that the concept of line-of-
business restrictions is not one that the MFJ invented. First, Congress from time to time
has imposed line-of-business restrictions in several industries. See, e.g., Investment Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629, 634 (1971) (describing prohibition in Glass-Steagall Act,
12 U.S.C. § 24, on involvement by commercial banks in the investment banking business);
cf. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79i, 79j(b)(1) (1994)
(prohibiting companies subject to Act from making corporate acquisitions unless the
Securities and Exchange Commission gives approval based on certain competition and
public-interest factors). Indeed, Congress has used line-of-business restrictions in the
telecommunications industry, for it formerly prohibited telephone companies from
providing video programming in their local telephone territories, see Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, § 613, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (1984),
codified before repeal at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994), as did the FCC before it, see Winston
P. Lloyd, Comment, What's the Frequency Uncle Sam? Will the Government Hold Up the
Information Superhighway in the Name of Competition?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 233,
242-44 (1995) (tracing history of this restriction from regulation to legislation). Second,
and in some respects more directly analogously to the MFJ, line-of-business restrictions
have been deployed in other antitrust litigation, both in consent decrees affecting a wide
variety of industries, see, e.g., TALBOT S. LINDSTROM & KENNETH P. TIGHE, ANTITRUST
CONSENT DECREES 551, 1188, 1370-71 (1974) (consent decrees involving MCA, Inc.,
American Optical Co., and Bausch & Lomb); United States v. National Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,855 (C.D. Cal. 1977); United States v. National
Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (Tunney Act decision on
NBC decree); infra note 259 (discussing meatpacking decree whose line-of-business
restrictions as revised lasted more than 60 years), and as a contested remedy after
adjudicated findings of liability, see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,
563,572 (1971).
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satisfied.25 9 This undoubtedly would have been the less preferable
alternative from the RBOCs' side (even though, notwithstanding his
having drafted section VIII(C), Judge Greene might have come to
prefer that approach). Finally, while there is some truth to claims
that Judge Greene took longer than desirable to resolve some of the
RBOCs' waiver motions, most of these were in the later years of the
MFJ's tenure when some of the RBOCs' motions were flying in the
face of much settled law under the MFJ. Moreover, Judge Greene
acted promptly on the "big issues" such as the triennial review in
1987, the triennial review remand on information services in the early
1990's, and the RBOCs' request for cellular long-distance authority in
the mid-1990's.26° The more substantial delays occurred in the
259. Indeed, at the time the MFJ was entered, it was assumed that, in the absence of
section VIII(C), the line-of-business restrictions could not be altered without the parties'
consent unless the demanding standard of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932), were met. Swift involved a 1920 consent decree under which various members of
the meatpacking industry were barred from engaging in the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of other foodstuffs. When the defendants moved for elimination of these
line-of-business restrictions in 1930, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of their
motion. The Court declared that "[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead.., to [a] change [in] what was
decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." Id. at 119; see United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 195 n.266 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussing Swift), affd mer.
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also Robert M. Aduddell &
Louis P. Cain, Public Policy Toward "The Greatest Trust in the World," 55 Bus. HIST.
REV. 217 (1981) (discussing meatpacking decree and early industry efforts to set it aside);
Robert M. Aduddell & Louis P. Cain, The Consent Decree in the Meatpacking Industry,
1920-1956,55 Bus. HST. REV. 359 (1981) (describing such efforts through July 1981, with
particular emphasis on 1956 decision refusing to terminate decree); United States v. Swift
& Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,464 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (terminating decree). Some
years after the MFJ was entered, the Supreme Court ruled that the Swift standard did not
govern contested motions to modify consent decrees entered in "institutional reform
litigation" (a category whose precise contours the Court did not specify), but that a lower
standard of "a significant change in facts or law" would govern such motions. Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 392-93 (1992). Notwithstanding subsequent
attempts by the RBOCs to rely on Rufo, the existence of the explicit standard in section
VIII(C) of the MFJ itself meant that the so-called "common law" standard for contested
motions to modify a consent decree (whether as set forth in Swift or as set forth in Rufo)
was not applied to RBOC motions for waivers or modifications of the line-of-business
restrictions that other parties (Le., the Department of Justice or AT&T) opposed. Cf.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (determining standard
for waiver motions opposed by AT&T); supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text
(discussing this ruling). Several RBOCs nonetheless relied in part on Rufo in their motion
to vacate the MFJ, but that motion, of course, was rendered moot after passage of the
Telecommunications Act resulted in the MFJ's termination.
260. See supra notes 141-42, 179, 200 and accompanying text. For a more extended
discussion of whether the waiver procedures worked inadequately (the RBOCs' view) or
were adequate except for the RBOCs' unexpected use of the procedures to make
continual piecemeal assaults on the MFJ and for the Department of Justice's failure
properly to apply section VIII(C) (AT&T's view), compare Motion of Bell Atlantic
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Department of Justice's waiver-review process. However, such delays
were not inherent in that process, which Judge Greene had designed,
but rather resulted from the Department's tendency even after the
triennial review to attempt to support the types of partial repeals of
the MFJ that not only Judge Greene but also the D.C. Circuit had
cautioned against because they did not conform to discrete antitrust
markets 261
Nor is it fair to label Judge Greene a "mini-FCC" who simply fly-
specked the RBOCs' businesses. Judge Greene's lack of desire to be
involved in the details of the RBOCs' business affairs is reflected in
one of his earliest and most important rulings: viz., his termination of
numerous entities' intervenor status after the MFJ had been
approved and upheld on appeal2 62 As Judge Greene explained at the
time and would later consistently require, anyone other than one of
the nine parties that sought to have the MFJ enforced would first be
required to complain to the Department of Justice and thereafter
would not be permitted to seek involvement by the court unless the
non-party could demonstrate "bad faith" on the Department's part.
This strict test for when a non-party could involve the court in an
MFJ matter was essential in helping to ensure that the district court
did not become a sort of rump administrative agency, to which any
party "adversely affected" by an RBOC's acts or failures to act could
turn for relief.263 This limitation on access to the district court
recognized that something beyond mere standing to sue should be
required for a non-party to have the ability to proceed against the
RBOCs under the MFJ. After all, any entity dissatisfied with the
Department of Justice's rejection of a request to seek enforcement of
the MFJ against the RBOCs retained the ability to file its own
antitrust lawsuit against the RBOCs-just as MCI, Sprint (then
known as Southern Pacific Communications), Litton Systems, and
others had done against the Bell System in the years leading up to,
and culminating in, the MFJ.264
At the same time, Judge Greene properly permitted limited
intervention after entry of the MFJ for purposes of appealing from
(or defending on appeal) any of his rulings under the MFJ. It is
Corporation, BellSouth Corporation, NYNEX Corporation, and Southwestern Bell
Corporation to Vacate the Decree at 92-102 (July 6, 1994) and id., Affidavit of Paul H.
Rubin, with AT&T's Opposition to the Four RBOCs' Motion to Vacate the Decree, at
159-73 (Dec. 7,1994) (submitted to Department of Justice).
261. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
263. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (Administrative Procedure Act provision concerning
parties entitled to seek judicial review of agency action).
264. See supra note 81 (citing examples of private antitrust actions brought against the
Bell System).
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apparent that this permission of intervention was even-handed: it was
extended to both those who agreed with and those who disagreed
with the district court's rulings.265  Such limited intervention-
particularly when combined with the requirement that any
intervenors needed to satisfy background principles of standing in
order to prosecute an appeal by themselves266-seems a principled
way of balancing the interests in a stable decree against the interests
in a correctly interpreted decree.
Judge Greene's handling of the triennial review also reflects well
on him. The underlying process was essentially conducted by the
Department of Justice, which used the visitatorial powers provided in
section VI of the MFJ to obtain information concerning the state of
the monopoly and competitive markets implicated by the MFJ. The
court, by contrast, played a reactive role, ruling promptly on the
various requests for relief that were filed after the Department had
submitted its report and recommendations.267
As for the substance of these rulings, Judge Greene's rejection of
the proposal that would have required near-constant judicial
superintendence-viz., the Department's suggestion that the RBOCs
be permitted entry into long distance on a state-by-state basis when
certain conditions were met-belies claims by some of his critics that
he was interested in ongoing, detailed oversight of the RBOCs'
activities. The same is true of Judge Greene's removal in the triennial
review of the MFJ's catch-all restriction.268 Not only did he recognize
that the restriction was no longer appropriate under the MFJ's
standards, but he did not attempt to attach to the removal the various
quasi-regulatory conditions on which he had previously granted
waivers of that restriction.269 Here, too, a judge whose desire to
shackle the RBOCs exceeded his interests in the antitrust laws and its
particular principles reflected in the MFJ would have ruled quite
differently.270
There remains the question of Judge Greene's interpretation of
265. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 286-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(listing, among others, non-party appellants and appellees in triennial review appeal).
266. See id at 309-10 (concluding that, notwithstanding its intervenor status, the Public
Service Commission of the District of Columbia lacked standing to challenge triennial
review ruling because it lacked injury in fact); cf. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797
F.2d 1082, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (RBOC lacked standing on appeal to challenge ruling
that by its strict terms applied only to other RBOC).
267. See supra notes 130-59 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 148-50, 156-59 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 108.
270. The D.C. Circuit's affirmance of most of Judge Greene's triennial review rulings
and its reversal of the information-services ruling have already been discussed. See supra
notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
section VIII(C). It is true that the D.C. Circuit felt impelled in its
triennial review opinion to write at length concerning its view of
section VIII(C)'s proper interpretation.271 Judge Greene of course
invited this discussion by his statements during the triennial review
reflecting a broader conception of his duties than merely undertaking
the section VIII(C) inquiry whether the petitioning RBOC had
shown that "there is no substantial possibility that it could use its
monopoly power to impede competition in the market it seeks to
enter."272  However, the D.C. Circuit did not doubt that these
statements had not influenced Judge Greene's legal analysis.
Moreover, the court of appeals' discussion was also directed at
rejecting various claims concerning section VIII(C) made by the
RBOCs and others such as the FCC.273 While the D.C. Circuit did
exhort Judge Greene to pay more heed to the Department of Justice's
predictive economic analysis under section VIII(C)-the court of
appeals could not bring itself to use the word "defer"-the most
fundamental point is that even in that ruling (as elsewhere) the court
rejected all challenges to Judge Greene's rulings under section
VIII(C).
These statements by Judge Greene concerning the RBOCs'
activities, for which he was chided in the triennial review appeal, gave
the RBOCs and those sympathetic to them an opportunity to criticize
Judge Greene. It is possible that Judge Greene's occasional
rhetorical flourishes, including his willingness to respond even in a
couched way to one Senator's inquiry concerning possible legislation
touching upon the MFJ,2 74 were ill-advised. Even leaving aside,
however, both that Judge Greene may have been correct in
statements that the RBOCs seemed more interested in an ascent into
the ranks of conglomerate corporate America than in the provision of
basic telephone service and that these statements were made in the
logical course of deciding various contested matters before the court
(as opposed to being made in external attempts to influence public
policy2 75), the statements afford little lasting basis on which to criticize
271. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 295-300 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
272. MFJ § VIII(C), reprinted in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,231 (D.D.C.
1982), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
274. See infra note 275.
275. An apparent exception to this is a letter that Judge Greene sent in response to a
letter from Senator Paul Simon that asked for the former's view of proposed legislation
that would have removed the manufacturing restriction of the MFJ. See Letter from
Harold H. Greene to the Hon. Paul Simon at 1 (May 29, 1991) (filed in the Western
Electric case on May 31, 1991); supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing this
legislation). Judge Greene stated that, while it was possible that the canons of judicial
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Judge Greene. Such statements were infrequent at most and, in all
events, cannot alter the central fact that for twelve years Judge
Greene provided precisely what the framers of the MFJ intended:
stability and certainty, grounded in defensible antitrust principles
written into the MFJ, so that the RBOCs' local monopolies did not
impair competition in closely related markets.
Conclusion
The decision by the Department of Justice and the Bell System
in 1982 to end their years of litigation through divestiture and going-
forward restrictions on the divested companies was of historic
proportions. Whether the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions on the
RBOCs benefited the American economy is a topic on which many
words were exchanged, studies commissioned, and reports submitted
to the courts, the executive branch, and Congress for more than a
decade. That question, at least in the form in which it previously
existed, has become moot since Congress altered these restrictions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Less studied, but of broader significance for future policy, has
been the question of whether the district court overseeing the MFJ
from 1982 until its termination in 1996 was undertaking and properly
discharging judicial functions. The conventional wisdom has become
that the court was overly involved in the RBOCs' affairs and evinced
constant hostility to the RBOCs' legitimate business interests. This
conventional wisdom has usually not been accompanied by an
account of the district court's actions under the MFJ, and no overall
retrospective of this important chapter in public policy has been
essayed.
This Article has provided that comprehensive account. While
this should permit others to make an informed assessment of the
district court's actions or at least to sort through this extraordinarily
complex litigation, which is a prerequisite for formulating one's views,
ethics permitted him to offer his opinion on the desirability of the bill, it seemed that any
such expression would create an appearance of impropriety. He nonetheless stated that
there was no reason that he could not "render assistance to the Subcommittee by calling
your attention to pertinent parts of published opinions in my court on the subject under
the Subcommittee's consideration." Letter from Harold H. Greene, supra, at 1. Judge
Greene then proceeded at some length to summarize aspects of both his and the D.C.
Circuit's triennial review opinions retaining the manufacturing restriction. He concluded
that "I wish to advise you that no evidence has come to my attention in the last three and
one-half years that would cast doubt on the findings and conclusions stated in [the
triennial review) opinion or call for their repudiation." Id. at 9. For differing views on the
propriety of Judge Greene's letter, see Building Bridges Instead of Walls: Fostering
Communication Between Judges and Legislators, JUDICATURE, Oct./Nov. 1981, at 167,
173-75.
this Article has also provided its own assessment. At the end of the
day, Judge Greene should be commended for the way he
administered the MFJ. He remained true to its adoption of a
structural solution to the problems that had long bedevilled the
telecommunications industry because of the Bell System's vertical
integration of monopoly and competitive telecommunications
businesses. Unlike the Department of Justice, which had insisted on
the MFJ's structural approach but later advocated before the courts
the primarily regulatory approach that it had come to favor instead,
Judge Greene recognized that it was not his role to abandon the
decree merely because of a shift in the Department's preferences.
The MFJ thus succeeded as a legitimate judicial enterprise because it
rested on an articulable economic theory and the court administering
it abided by that theory. Absent evidence that "something [was]
different [since] the time when the decree was entered, '2 76 any
revision at odds with that theory would have been lawless if
undertaken by the district court.
276. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283,298 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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